University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1995

Water allocation in California: A geographical assessment of
conflicting values and public policy
Gwyn-Mohr Pierce Tully
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Tully, Gwyn-Mohr Pierce, "Water allocation in California: A geographical assessment of conflicting values
and public policy" (1995). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8531.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8531

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

1

m

Î

i

im

Maureen and Mike

MANSFIELD LIBRARY

The University o f

IVIONTANA

Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety,
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in
published works and reports.

** Please check **Yes" or

and provide signature **

Yes, I grant permission
N o, I do not grant permission

____

Author's Signature
Date
Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with
the author's explicit consent.

WATER ALLOCATION IN CALIFORNIA:
A GEOGRAPHICAL ASSESSMENT OF CONFLICTING VALUES
AND PUBLIC POLICY

by
Gwyn-Mohr Pierce Tully
A.B. University of California at Berkeley, 1992
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
The University of Montana
1995

App^pi^e^^y:

Chairmaffr Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

vTlxixy' ICli
Date

^

UMI Number; EP39332

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL U SERS
T he quality of this reproduction is d ep en d en t upon the quality of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not sen d a com plete m anuscript
and there are m issing p ag es, th e se will be noted. Also, if material had to be rem oved,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
Publishing

UMI EP39332
Published by ProQ uest LLC (2013). Copyright in the D issertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQ uest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected ag ain st
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United S ta te s C ode

ProQ^sf
ProQ uest LLC.
789 E ast Eisenhow er Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346

Tully, Gwyn-Mohr Pierce, M.A., May 1995
Processes of Water Allocation in California:
Geographical Analysis (150 pp.)
Director:

Geography
An Historical

Dr. Jeffrey A. Gritzner

Water is an extremely difficult resource to manage. Not only
does it naturally move through the air, over the land, and under the
ground, but each aspect of this movement is subject to changes
caused by the environmental alterations of man. Since California's
earliest occupation, water resources have been manipulated and
utilized to serve mankind's needs. Each society identified its goals
and produced public policies which reflected its cultural convictions
and technological adaptations. Current trends indicate that the once
abundant resource is becoming increasingly scarce as California's
population continues to grow and the old politics of water-resource
development become obsolete.
Advances in scientific knowledge regarding hydrological systems
have heightened the public's awareness of many of the
environmental and socio-economic problems caused by water
resource development.
This enlightenment has complicated the
water allocation process, forcing many Californians to search for new
sources of water. Increased political pressures caused by an
increased societal concern for environmental preservation have
forced public policy experts to assess reallocations of developed
supplies through water transfers.
This inquiry seeks to: 1) Assess the characteristics, strengths,
and weaknesses of California's past water adjudication systems; 2)
Identify the goals of an efficient and equitable water allocation
system; and 3) Explore the comparative advantages of two modern
distributional systems: The Public Trust Doctrine and water
m arketing.
The conclusions of this study are: 1) Water allocation problems
in California are a result of mismanagement rather than water
scarcity; 2) Good allocation policy requires precise definitions of law
and public policy; 3) Water transfers through water markets is the
best means of combining divergent public interests with efficient
allocation and equitable distribution.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
P r o b le m
Water moves throughout the atmosphere, biosphere, and
lithosphere in the hydrological cycle.

This continuous movement

alters the physical, chemical, biological, and aesthetic properties of a
given water resource.

Human beings influence and facilitate these

hydrological changes, both directly and indirectly, through their
social interpretations and physical manipulations of land, air, and
water.

However, as social interpretations of humankind's

relationship with the environment change, so must the laws and
policies guiding resource manipulation.

Historically, Indians,

Spaniards, miners, farmers, and industrialists created water laws
which conformed to their needs and reflected their perceptions of
California's environment.

Consequently, each culture has left its

imprint upon California's water policies.

In recent years, Californians

redirected their environmental priorities from resource development
and consumption to resource protection.^

As a result, water policies

^This new attitude evolved from the earlier conservation and
preservation movements o f such people as Gifford Pinchot, Theodore
Roosevelt, John Wesley Powell, and John Muir. They were highlighted in 1970
by Richard Nixon when he signed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). See Henry P. Caulfield, "The Conservation and Environmental
Movements:
An Historical Analysis," Environm ental Politics and P olicy, edited
by James P. Lester, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989), 1356.
Hereafter, Caulfield, "Conservation," E nvironm ental P o litic s.

are emerging from 230 years of river diversion, dam construction,
and wetlands reclamation into an era of previously developed waterresource reallocation.
This new attitude has produced a conflict between two
methods of reallocation:
marketing.”

the “Public Trust Doctrine” and “water

Although both aim to reallocate California’s scarce water

resources, they are dissimilar in their approaches.

The Public Trust

Doctrine allows judicial intervention in reallocation debates, whereby
the courts decide to whom and for what purpose(s) the water
resource shall be allocated.

On the other hand, water marketing is a

legislatively administered and primarily free-enterprise method for
voluntary and private reallocation.

This growing conflict has created

an aura of uncertainty regarding water policy and law among waterright holders and, hence, has likely prevented reapportionment from
occurring.2

P urpose

and

P roced ure

The science of geography deals with location, place, movement,
human/environment interactions, and regions on the surface of the
earth.

The content of a region is inherently dynamic, constantly

changing as physical, biological, and cultural processes interact over
time.

Therefore, in order to understand California’s current

hydrogeography and water policies, these dynamic mechanisms must
be examined.

In this enquiry, I shall use historical geographical

^Zachary McCormick, "Institutional Barriers to W ater M arketing in the
West," W ater Resources Bulletin 30 (November/December 1994), 953.
H ereafter, M cCorm ick, "Institutional B arriers,"

research techniques to correlate California's cultural development
with contemporary water policies.
There are six basic steps in historical geographical research:
One, describing the variation in the physical environment at different
periods in time.

Two, describing the relationship between human

beings and the physical environment at different periods in time.
Three, applying generic insights by categorizing and classifying
different physical and human environments.

Four, presenting a

genetic reconstruction of historical changes in cultural land-use
patterns and the policies associated with these patterns.

Five,

drawing upon the results from the genetic investigation to analyze
covariant patterns between cultures and environment.

Finally, to

integrate the historical covariant patterns with the contemporary
culture's dynamics and structure.^

This final stage will explore the

comparative advantages of the Public Trust Doctrine and water
m arketing.
The procedures for this enquiry are as follows.

First, I shall

use historical descriptions and modern interpretations to summarize
the natural environment of California, outlining the important
hydrological features of the landscape.

These include landforms,

precipitation patterns, and watershed systems.

Then, I shall describe

the current landscape and its hydrological patterns.

In doing so, I

^For inform ation on the process o f historical geographical enquiry s e e
Edward A. Ackerman, "Geography as a Fundamental Research Discipline,"
(Chicago, Illinois:
The Department of Geography, The University of Chicago,
1958) and National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council,
"The Science of Geography," Report o f the Ad Hoc Committee on Geography,
(W ashington, D C., 1965).

shall emphasize water supply by grouping systems and producing
generalized hydrological regions.
Second, I shall give an historical geographical description of the
development of the current system of California water rights, water
policy, and water law as they relate to various cultural influences.
Past cultures developed water-allocation systems in relation to their
environmental surroundings, cultural values, and socio-econom ic
concerns.

Therefore, since many of the existing water laws in

California are derived from ancient cultures, an understanding

of

these concerns is necessary in order to understand their current
applications.

The Public Trust Doctrine and water marketing both

combine many earlier ideals and water laws with contemporary
political demands.
Third, 1 shall compare and contrast the Public Trust Doctrine
with water marketing as a means of water reallocation.

I shall use

the water resource allocation model designed by Charles Howe,
Dennis R. Schurmeier, and W. Douglass Shaw as the foundation for
this discussion."*
1.

2.
3.

The model has five parts:

F lex ib ilitv —allow water to be shifted in location, season,
and purpose of use in response to changing social and
economic conditions;
Secure expectations—gives water users a basis for
making long-term investment and planning decisions;
Opportunitv costs—identifving and utilizing alternatives
to resource use;

"^Charles W. Howe, Dennis R. Schurmeier, and W. Douglass Shaw,
"Innovative Approaches to W ater Allocation:
The Potential for W ater Markets,"
W ater R esources R esearch 22 (1986): 438-445. Hereafter, Howe, et al.,
"In n o v ativ e A pproaches."

4.
5.

P redictability—rules of allocation and transfer should be
clear and not subject to unexpected changes;
F airn ess—costs imposed upon primary, secondary, and
tertiary parties must be accounted for.

Each of these water-resource allocation elements are influenced by
the bio physical environment, the behavior of individuals and
groups, and the policies and laws adhered to by society.
This enquiry applies historical geographical research methods
to explain the genesis of California's current water policy and law.
This research requires an understanding of the processes that cause
environmental and socio-economic change.

Historically, the agents of

this change were primarily natural rather than cultural, as they are
today.

Understanding these relationships requires quantitative

observations of physical phenomena in California's hydrological
system.

These facts will complement the qualitative historical

analysis of social values, political organization, administrative
methods, and technological development.

CHAPTER 2
HYDROLOGICAL DESCRIPTION
California is an extraordinary place.

Geographically, its

extreme isolation, erratic climate, and regional diversity have played
an integral part in shaping its unusual history.

It offers an enormous

variety of physical, climatic, geological, and vegetational
combinations:

extremely wet climates and extremely dry climates;

poor sandy soil and thick, fertile loams; the highest mountain in the
Continental United States (Mount Whitney, 14,496 feet) and the
lowest point in the entire country (Death Valley, -282 feet); scrub
brush in Southern California and the Giant Sequoias in the Sierra
Nevada Mountain Range.

These diverse physical features have set

the stage for a diversity of peoples who, in turn, have manipulated
and exploited California's resources to satisfy their cultural needs.
California has five principal physical features:
foremost is its great size.

First and

California occupies 158,693 square miles of

surface area making it the third largest state in the union.

It extends

north-south over nearly ten degrees of latitude, between the 32nd
and 42nd parallels, forming over 1264 miles of coastline.

Second, on

the eastern side of the state, the lofty Sierra Nevadas isolate
California along a 500-mile stretch from the rest of the continental
United States.

Third, the Coast Range, which parallels the Sierra

Nevadas, spans almost the entire western seaboard.

These two

mountain ranges confine the fourth feature, the Great Central Valley,
constituting the heartland of California.

The intermontane regions of

the northeastern plateau and the southeastern deserts make up the
final major topographic feature^ (fig. 1).
The mountains of the Coast Range average approximately 4000
feet in height, but a few peaks in the northern Klamath mountains
and the southern Transverse ranges extend from 9000 to 11,600
feet.

Inland more than forty peaks of the Sierra Nevadas exceed

10,000 feet in height, and a dozen of those exceed 14,000 feet.^
Because of this natural barrier, the western slope of the Sierras
extracts considerable moisture from Pacific storms, and is thereby
replete with streams, rivers, and lakes.

A large part of the alpine

overland flow and ground water systems eventually wind their way
into the Central Valley, to be intercepted by either the Sacramento or
San Joaquin rivers (fig. 2).

These two drainages constitute the state's

largest navigable rivers.7
As James J. Parsons has pointed out, "It so happens that
California’s arbitrarily conceived boundaries outline the only area of
winter rain and summer drought in North America. "8

Rainfall in

California normally occurs between late October and early May.

In

5William L. Kahrl, ed., The California Water Atlas ( S a c ra m en to :
Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, 1979), 4, 10, 12, 14, 17. Hereafter
Kahrl, C alifornia W ater A tlas.
^Map of California. Raven Maps and Images. Allan Cartography,
Medford Oregon 1992.
7Andrew Rolle, California A History. (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, 1963), 328. The word navigable, as will be explained later, has many
meanings.
Hereafter, Rolle, California A H istory.
^James J. Parsons, "The Uniqueness of California," A m erican O uarterlv
7 (Spring 1955); 45-55.
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the state as a whole, the average annual precipitation is 23.88
inches,^ but climatic diversity invalidates the significance of that
average.
regions:

California can be divided into ten natural hydrologie
These are the North Coast (NC); the San Francisco Bay (SF);

the Central Coast (CC); the South Coast (SC); the Sacramento River
(SR); the San Joaquin River (SJ); Tulare Lake (TL); North Lahontan
(NL); South Lahontan (SL); and the Colorado River (CR)io (fig. 3).

The

average annual precipitation for these regions ranges from 51.0
inches per year in the North Coast region to 5.5 inches per year in
the Colorado River region.

Moreover, in some areas of the North

Coast region over 120 inches of precipitation accumulate each year,
while in the Colorado Region less than one inch of precipitation in
certain areas is not uncommon.
Once on the ground, the combined average of nearly 200
million acre feet (MAF) of precipitation continues to progress through
the hydrological cycle in three ways:

It may re-enter the

atmosphere through évapotranspiration;
runoff; or percolate into the soil.

become

surface-water

In an average year, approximately

119.5 MAF evapotranspires, while nearly 74 MAF flows through the
system as surface runoff.
for human

c o n s u m p t i o n . 12

Only about half of that runoff is avaiable
Ground water systems receive

^Kahrl, C alifornia W ater A tlas, supra note 5, 10.
I ^Raymond D. Hart, et al., California W ater Plan Update. Department of
W ater Resources, November 1993. Bulletin 160-93, Vol. I, 49. Hereafter Hart,
California W ater Plan Update. Vol. I.
II David Hornbeck, California Patterns:
A Geographical and_ Historical
A tla s. (Mountainview, California: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1983), 23.
Hereafter
Hornbeck, C alifornia P atterns. See also Hart, C alifornia W ater Plan U pdate,
Vol. I, supra note 10, 49.
12Kahrl, California W ater A tlas: supra note 5, 12
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resides in the
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water could be reclaimed for use.^5
California's unique geographical configuration confines the
majority of its water resources within the state boundaries.

The

major exceptions are the Colorado river in the south, the Klamath
river in the north, and Lake Tahoe and the Truckee river basin in the
east.

The areal extent of all of the ground-water basins is not

com pletely

k n o w n , 17

and, therefore, many aquifers may have

undiscovered hydrological connections outside of the state's political
dom ain.
Droughts and floods have plagued California throughout its
history.

The recorded all-time low surface runoff was 15 MAF in

1977 while the all-time high exceeded 135 MAF in 19831^ (fig. 4).
Dendrochronological records indicate that significantly larger
droughts are not uncommon for regions within California.

Tree-ring

l^H art, California W ater Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 49.
1^Gilbert L. Bertoldi, Richard H. Johnston, and K.D. Evenson. "Ground
W ater in the Central Valley, California—A Summary Report."
U.S. Geological
Survey Professional Paper 1401-A. United States Government Printing Office,
Washington: 1991, A l.
1^Departm ent of W ater Resources, Layperson’s Guide to C alifornia
Ground W ater, prepared by the Water Education Foundation, 1986, 1-4. See also
Hornbeck, C alifornia P atterns, supra 10, 85; McCormick, "Institutional
Barriers," supra note 2; and Kahrl, California W ater A tlas, supra note 5.
^^Map of California. Raven Maps and Images. Allan Cartography,
Medford, Oregon 1992.
^7Raymond D. Hart, et al., California's Ground W ater. Department of
W ater Resources, November 1990. Bulletin 118-80, 93.
Hart, California^W ater Plan U pdate. Vol. I, supra note 10, 47
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studies of California for a 360-year period indicate that the longest
interval of minimum growth (reflecting an extended drought) was
the sixty-one years from 1760-1820, whereas the decade between
1935 and 1944 (with a minimum annual precipitation of nineteen
inches) emerges as a period of maximum vegetative growth rarely
approached in the past.

Other lengthy periods of deficient

precipitation were 1600-1625,
1992.19

1720-1730,

1865-1885, and 1987-

These examples represent extremes, but none of the cycles

are of predictable length and they vary from place to place with the
result that while one area experiences drought another may be
literally under water (table 1).
Throughout the state, there has always been danger of flood.
During the Gold Rush days, the northern communities of Sacramento,
Stockton, Oroville, and Marysville were plagued by massive winter
inundations which sometimes burst through the artificial levees and
dikes that confine the American, Feather, Sacramento, and San
Joaquin r i v e r s . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , one of the most serious flood threats
exists in semi-arid Southern California.

In fact, Santa Anita Canyon,

near Pasadena, once held a national record for rainfall:

In 1938,

twenty-six inches of rain fell in a twenty-four hour p e r i o d . T h u s ,

^^Harold C. Fritts and Geoffrey A. Gordon, "Annual Precipitation for
C alifornia since 1600 Reconstructed from W estern North American Tree
Rings," California Department of Water Resources, (July 1980): 38-40. See also,
M. K. Hughes, et al.. Climate From Tree Rings (Cambridge: Cambridge
U niversity Press, 1982).
20Rolle, California A History, supra note 7, 490-97. In 1983 and 1986,
flooding again occurred on the Mokelumne, American, Sacramento and San
Joaquin rivers.
Floods have been forecasted for the spring runoff o f 1995 as
w ell.
Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert (New York: Penguin Books, 1986) , 55.
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Table 1.
Pre-1900 Dry Periods and Droughts since 1900

1579

-

1582

4

R u n o ff
M A F /y e a r
12.4

1593

-

1595

3

9.3

1600

-

1625
1655

26
5
11

13.2
12.6

3

12.2

6

13.3
12.1

P e r io d

1651
1720
1735
1755
1776
1793
1839
1843
1918
1929

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1959

-

1976

-

1987

-

1730

L e n g th

1737
1760
1778

3

1795
1841
1846

3
3
4

1920
1934
1962

3
6
4

1977
1992

2
6

12.3

10.7
12.9
12.3
12
9.8
13
6.6
10
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great irregularity characterizes the “typical” precipitation pattern
throughout California.
The geography of California during American Indian occupation
was drastically different from what it is today.

Indigenous cultures,

which occupied the state for nearly 40,000 years before European
con tact, 22 had neither the need nor the technology to substantially
alter environmental systems.

Although the native Californians, did

use fire to flush game and refertilize lands, most of the region’s
physical environment remained relatively static during their entire
occupation.23

Hydrologically, the Central Valley consisted of several

gigantic swamps.

The two largest regions, the Tulare Lake region

and the Bay/Del ta floodplain, were flooded every spring by massive
surface runoff.

Likewise, artesian wells flowing from saturated

ground-water basins also helped flood the central lowlands.

These

floods deposited fertile alluvial soils which supported vigorous
vegetative

growth.

Historically, huge fresh water marshes and dense riparian
forests lined every stream in the Central Valley and Pacific Coast.
Along the San Francisco, Monterey, Los Angeles, and San Diego coasts,
salt marshes occupied the land adjacent to flooding rivers.24
Perennial grasses and forbs, such as California needlegrass {Stipa
p u lch ra ) and pine bluegrass (Poa scabrella)^ covered nearly the
entire length of the Central Valley and followed river systems in the
central and southern coastal regions, where today introduced
22por more information on this topic see Carter, E a rlie r, infra note 28.
23See generally A.L. Kroeber, Handbook o f the Indians of California
(New York; Dover Publications, Inc., 1976). Hereafter, Kroeber, H a n d b o o k .
24H ornbeck, C alifornia P attern s, supra note 11,14
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annuals, such as foxtail {Bromus rubens) and wild oats {A ven ta
fa tu a ), dominate these habitats.^5

Riparian forests of phreatophytes,

oaks, willows, and shrubs followed the paths of the river systems as
well, while artesian springs supported numerous species of plants in
isolated communities.

The high water table and the annual floods

supported the biological productivity of the river systems and their
related floodplains.26
The variety of vegetation also provided forage and habitat for a
variety of animals.

Herds of Tule elk and pronghorn antelope

wandered the grasslands and riparian systems.

Numerous species of

fish, salmon in particular, used the myriad waterways to spawn,
while beavers harvested the abundant vegetation.
wolves preyed upon the foraging fish and game.

Grizzly bears and
Millions of

migratory birds, including ducks, geese, egrets, and herons, used the
natural swampland for feeding grounds en route to northern or
southern destinations.

During indigenous occupation, California was

one of the most fertile and diverse biological regions in the world.27
From this brief overview one can see that perhaps the key
word to describe California’s natural hydrogeography, as well as most
of her other characteristics, is variety—indeed, grandiose and
unpredictable variety.

The vivid contrasts in climate, topography,

and hydrology, combined with the unique characteristics of the
plants, animals, and cultures that have previously occupied this land.
25Michael Barbour and William Dwight Billings, ed., N orth A m erican
T errestrial V egetation (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988), 266-283.

26ibid.
27$ee generally, Vinson Brown and George Lawrence, The C alifornian
W ildlife R egion (Healdsburg, California:
Naturegraph Publishers, 1965).
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all contribute to the convolution of present day water resource policy
and law.
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CHAPTER 3
HUMAN SETTLEMENT AND WATER ADJUDICATION
In d ig en o u s

C a lifo r n ia n s

American Indians settled California as early as 100,000 years
ago, either by descending from Alaska after crossing the Bering Strait
or ascending from Mesoamerica after migrating by boat from
P o l y n e s i a . I n any case, almost 500 groups with a total population
of 275,000 to 310,000, inhabited the present state of California.^9
Large villages clustered in four primary zu^eas:

along the Pacific

coast; along the lower courses of large streams; on the banks of small
lakes below 4000 feet; and in the semi-arid and arid regions of the
present-day Mojave Desert (fig. 5).

Each settlement reflected the

characteristics of the local environment, and always had a reliable
water resource in close proximity—whether a stream, lake, or spring.
The settlement patterns of the California Indians reflect an
incredibly diverse mixture of people and institutions adapted to
various physical environments.30

The basis of California Indian

28George F. Carter, Earlier Than You Think. (College Station, Texas:
Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 3. Hereafter, Carter, E a rlie r. While such
an early date rem ains controversial, it is increasingly finding support in the
a rch aeo lo g ical record.
29Sherburne F. Cook, The Population of the California Indians 1769-1970
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London:
University of California Press, 1976), 1416, 33-34. Hereafter, Cook, C alifornia Indians.
30Kroeber, H a n d b o o k , supra note 23, throughout.
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settlement was the sib, a small, self-governing, autonomous socio
political group, usually identified by linguistic dialect.^i

There were

approximately 500 sibs containing populations ranging from 50 to
1000 people.

One important feature of the sib was its role as the

basic landholding unit in indigenous society and, in turn, the
foundation that lent character to the aboriginal landscape.

Control of

land was based upon occupancy and continued use.
California Indians were mostly fisherfolk and hunter-gatherers.
They harvested what nature provided:
game.

salmon, acorns, and wild

Their existence depended upon a steady and recurrent source

of food, over which the sib could claim exploitative rights.

Unlike

Europeans, who frequently established rivers as boundaries,
California Indians reserved the entire watershed of streams as
natural territories.

Such an outlook reflected economic as well as

political considerations, for it ordinarily gave a native community
control of both banks of a river or stream, providing easy access to
the abundant game and fowl that sought out such water courses.

It

also meant for the community a greater variety of available
resources.
l o c a t i o n . 32

Water played the most significant role in village
it was a simple concept:

live beside it.

go to where the water was and

Thus, the earliest Californians made little change in

the landscape, but relied upon water resources and the surrounding
ecosystem s for survival,
Indian sibs that inhabited the southern semi-arid zones of
California did manipulate water resources to “improve” their natural
31 Cook, C alifo rn ia . Indians, supra 29.
32Robert F. Heizer, "The California Indians:
Archaeology, Varieties of
Culture, Arts of Life," California Historical Society 41 (March 1962): 1-28.
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world.

By 200 B.C., agricultural Indians such as the Owens Valley

Paiutes built dams and canals and even maintained an irrigation
h ie r a r c h y .

33

The head irrigator, called a tuvaijii'*, was responsible for

the annual construction and destruction of dams and canals.

Other

groups, including the Chemehuevi, Maricopa, Mojave, and Yuma,
cultivated the lower Colorado river, including the Imperial Valley,
with similar resource

m a n ip u la tio n .

34

Another aspect of early water systems was the absence among
California Indians of private property rights in the use of water.

The

concept itself was completely alien, because water, like land,
belonged to no individual, but rather was interconnected with all of
nature and essential for both human and animal survival.

Water use

was reserved for the occupying group and the surrounding
environment, for one depended upon the other.

Such utopian

wisdom notwithstanding, California Indians jealously defended their
territories and, in doing so, they were also guarding the springs,
streams, and rivers that watered those lands and attracted the
wildlife that contributed to their survival.

Viewed this way, water

b e lo n g e d to a particular community and, especially in the more arid
regions, might well have been the source of conflict and even
w a r f a r e . 35

The public interests of the community were only

considered for the groups that maintained resource control.

Thus,

3 3John Ressier, "Indian and Spanish W ater Control on New Spain's
North W est Frontier," Journal of the West 7 (January 1968): 10-17.
34por more inform ation on the agricultural practices o f California
Indians see Kroeber, H a n d b o o k , supra note 23, throughout.
35Norris Hundley, Jr., The Great Thirst Californians and W ater 1770's1990's (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 23-4, Hereafter,
Hundley, The Great Thirst.
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diversity in public interests was not a factor in interpreting water
allocation.
S p a n ish

S e ttle m e n t

The rise of non-indigenous civilization in California began
remarkably late because of its extreme geographical remoteness
from Europe and Asia, and even from the original Spanish and British
colonial settlements in the Western Hemishpere.

The Spanish

founded their first settlement on the Pacific Coast in 1519, at
P a n a m a .

36

Not until 1769, two and a half centuries later, did Caspar

de Portola establish Spain’s first permanent community in Alta
California at San

D i e g o . 37

Slowly, they migrated up the coast to San

Francisco, the northern limit of their New World colonies, without
penetrating the interior regions of the state.3*

Discovering that much

of California, especially the southern regions, was similar to Old
World Spain in both climate and topography. New Spain’s settlement
patterns and socio-economic structures imitated traditional Spanish
p a tte r n s

and

s t r u c t u r e s .3 9

Spanish colonialists had three primary forms of settlement:
First, the religious missions, whose function was to convert
indigenous Californians to Christianity.

Second, the presidios, or

military outposts, which were designed to defend New Spain from
Indian uprisings and colonial aggression.

Last, the pueblo, or civil

36w arren L Cook, Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific N o r th w e st
1 5 4 3 -1 8 1 9 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973). Hereafter,
Cook, Flood Tide.

37ibid.
38Hornbeck, C alifornia

Patterns, supra note 11, 40-1.

39cook, Flood Tide, supra note 36.
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community, which assembled both Native Americans and Spanish
immigrants into small towns.

Each of these communities engaged in

agricultural production and were always located on or near a source
of fresh water.

The pueblos, representing the majority of Spanish

citizens, administered central control over the distribution and
consumption of water resources.

Dividing water among the missions,

presidios, and pueblos, while simultaneously pacifying individual and
societal goals, proved to be an immense task for the central
authority.
The Spanish held the Catholic ideal that humankind held
complete dominion over n a t u r e . T h i s concept was not only rooted
in Judeo-Christian traditions, but was also consistent with Phoenician,
Greek, Roman, and Moorish influences upon the Iberian landscape.^ i
It was a viewpoint that held if nature was to be useful, then nature
had to be con t r o l l e d . T h e Spanish occupation of a semi-arid
landscape in Europe meant that water was already considered a
highly valued resource, and those who controlled water resources
controlled the entire Iberian Peninsula.

Similarly, in New Spain, they

realized that controlling water meant controlling the Native
Americans and the lands they

o c c u p ie d .^ 3

40lbid
Hundley. The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 27.
4^C.J. Glacken, Traces_on the Rhodian Shore:__ Nature and_Culture_in
W estern Thought from Ancient Times to the end of the Eighteenth Century
(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1967).
43For a more detailed analysis on the control of Native Americans
through resource dom ination see Michael Meyer, W ater in the Hispanic
Southwest: A Social and Legal Historv. 1550-1850 (Tuscon, Arizona: University
of Arizona Press, 1984). Hereafter Meyer, W ater in the Hispanic Southw est.
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New Spains water law can be found in a document known as
the "Plan of Pi tic.

Fundamental to this plan was the principle that

the residents of a pueblo share all of the water resources.

Since

water was “for the common benefit,” no one had a superior right that
could be exercised to the detriment of others, including
discrimination towards Native Americans.

In fact, the Plan of Pitic

stated that “...pastures, woodlands, waters, hunting grounds, fishing
areas,...and other things [the pueblo] produces shall be for the
common benefit of Spaniards and

I n d ia n s . ”45

As early as 1681,

because of the growing confusion, Spain had been compelled to
codify the enormous number of laws pertaining to the New World in
the Recopilacion de ley es de los reynos de las Indias, and the second
volume in Novisima Recopilacion in

1 8 0 5 .4 6

These both explicitly

stated that all title to land, water, and minerals were held by the
crown unless it granted outright ownership or temporary right of
use.

The land and water grants to missions, presidios, and pueblos

were usufructuary (temporary) in nature, meaning that the
occupants held only the right to use the resources not to own them.
The volume of usable water varied according to individual and
community needs, and according to available supply.

The authority

responsible for assuring fairness was the local cablido or town
council, whose members were elected by the residents.47 The
44john W. Dwindle. The Colonial History: City of San Francisco. 4th ed.
(San Francisco, California: Towne & Bacon Publishing, 1867, text-fiche). This
book translates the material in the Plan o f Pitic.

45ibid.
^ ^ S e e Meyer, W ater in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
47Michael Meyer and William L, Shelman, The Course o f Mexican
H istorv. 3d. ed., (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 157-158.
also see Meyer, W ater in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43, 30-35.
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ca b lid o would adjudicate these resources as they believed proper.
Their basic principle in allocating water was ‘proportionality’—people
obtaining an amount to use in proportion to their legitimate needs
and in proportion to the volume of water available.

Of necessity,

such a determination had to be made within the context of the needs
of everyone in a community, and hence the amount of water
allocated to an individual was never fixed.

Disputes could be

appealed to higher authorities, but the ultimate goal was to apportion
water fairly to

each user, and to prevent conflict.^* If they failed in

their duties, the public would call for an election and the
objectionable member(s) would be

r e p l a c e d . ^9

Simply put, the

community had local jurisdiction over locally shared water resources.
The traditional emphasis upon community carried with it
recognition of a water right possessed by irrigation districts, towns,
and other corporate municipalities.

The rights often blurred the

distinction between public and private for competing communities,
since some private landholders had distinct claims to water
resources.

The only water to which a community, or anyone for that

matter, could claim an exclusive right was that granted by the crown
or that originating on the property itself.^0

Hence, water taken from

springs and wells belonged solely to the owner of the land.

The

4BSee Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35. The higher author!tes
consisted of the governor who was appointed by the crown.
Essentially the
final decision lay with a governm ent authority which indicated central
c o n tr o l.
^ 9 Such was the case in Los Angeles on several occassions. The cablido
had neglected their duties and many of them were summarily replaced after
the residents had been gathered for a vote.
Records o f the Los Angeles
Ayuntamiento, March 23, 1839, January 29, 1844, and June 16, 1838; taken from
Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35.
50Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
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private ground water rights they created could take precedence over
those of larger communities as long as the resource was not being
m aliciously used.51

"Malicious use" meant preventing others from

using the water if one did not choose to or causing damage to other
peoples' property by irresponsible water use.
such thing as "over use."

However, there was no

This Spanish legal principle was traceable

to the Old World misunderstanding of the interrelationship between
surface and ground water.
In disputes between an individual and a community or in a
dispute involving different kinds of communities, the principle of
“equity and justice,” as enunciated in the Plan of Pitic and other
regulations, became the fundamental test of fairness.

Yet, often, it

was this clash of public interests that caused excrutiatingly difficult
situations.

For example, the pueblo of Branciforte and the mission at

Santa Cruz, around present day San José, had competing claims to the
waters of the San Lorenzo River.

Two communities, each holding

legitimate public interests, were in direct conflict.

The mission

claimed that it was the supreme Spanish settlement, while the
pueblo considered itself supreme, maintaining that its water rights
should be considered paramount.

Each argued that secure water

supplies helped pacify the surrounding Indian populations.

The

result was that the mission, the upstream user, diverted water which

^^T his third party identification was of primary importance in the
water law of colonial Spain. The only third parties consedered were other
water users, rather than third parties associated with the benefits of the water
consumption.
For instance, a worker employeed for the landowner had no
"right" to the water used on the land. For information regarding this issue see
Curtis W ilgus, Colonial Hispanic Am erica. 4th ed., (Washington, D C.: George
W ashington U niversity Press, 1936), 184.
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finally led to the abandonment of the downstream

Thus, as

p u e b lo .52

the population grew and use of water bodies diversified, social
problems related to water consumption intensified.

Each settlement

change affected a change in the social norms of water use which, in
turn, produced new issues that became central to the elaboration of
law and public policy.
A Spanish community's responsibility for a water system
extended to the quality, as well as the quantity, of supply.

Multiple-

use water was not only used for animals, laundry, and sewage, but
for drinking water as well.

Detailed local ordinances regulated use to

prevent the pollution of surface-water destined for human
consumption, but the opportunities for abuse by the careless or naïve
were many.

In Los Angeles, the ca b lid o was constantly battling to

maintain the potability of the community’s drinking water by
attempting to control those putting trash in, bathing or washing
clothes in, laying drain pipes in, allowing their cattle in, or building
cesspools too near the zanja madre, or main

d itch .

53 The right to

share water meant nothing if the supply was polluted.

It was

sharing between public uses that often created the problems.
Just like the Indians, the concept of the common good was also
invariably ethnocentric when translated into action.

Indian labor

was absolutely necessary for the construction and maintenance of
hydraulic works.

Freedom for the Indians meant laboring for a

foreign culture on behalf of God, country, and other men’s profits.

In

1836, shrinking labor supplies compelled the fledgling pueblo of Los
5 2Meyer, W ater in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
53ibid., 30-35
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Angeles to force criminals into labor to build and repair irrigation
ditches and

ca n a ls.

54

Simultaneously, the c a b lid o increased the

number of offenses and the length of prison terms, basically ensuring
the availability of “slave” labor by California

I n d i a n s .55

The Spanish

experience with California's water reflected the general Hispanic
commitment to bien procumunal (the common good)-but only for
the dominant culture.
Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821, and
immediately tried to solidify its hold upon California by expanding
private settlements.

In 1848, at the end of the Mexican-American

war, Mexico ceded California to the United States through the treaty
of Guadalupe-Hildalgo.

In this treaty, the United States agreed to

honor all pre-existing titles to property.56

The combination of the

private settlements and the powerful legal implications of the treaty
have created an interesting twist to California's current water law
and policy.

First, the treaty must be obeyed; and second, the water

rights which the treaty endorses are antecedent to all water rights
even those of the federal government itself.57

The adoption of these

laws was an unforeseen blunder.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and on into the
twentieth, some California communities asserted a so-called “pueblo
water right” based upon the legacy of Spanish water

l a w . 58

Pueblos

The Great Thirst, supra note 35.
55lbid., 58-62.
56Joseph L. Sax, Robert H. Abrams, and Barton H Thompson, Jr., L e g a l
Control o f Water Resources. 2d ed., (Minneapolis, Minnesota: West Publishing
Company, 1991), 360f. Hereafter Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control.
57ibid., 360.
58ibid., 361.
5 4 H u n d lc y ,

30

possess a paramount right to the beneficial and reasonable use of all
needed naturally-occurring surface and subsurface water from the
entire watershed of any stream flowing through the pueblo.

The

quantity of water available for use under a pueblo right increases
with population and with extensions of city limits by the annexation
of land not within the original pueblo.

Los Angeles has been the

most aggressive and successful city in advancing such a claim, and
has persuaded the

California courts toaward it exclusive right to the

Los Angeles River and the runoff of the entire 500-square-mile
watershed, and its associated groundwater reserves—a victory that
helped assure Los Angeles’ emergence
California and the

W est.5 9

as the preeminent city of

San Diego has also won formal judicial

recognition of a pueblo right.

However, neither the principles of

Spanish and Mexican water law nor the water disputes engaged in by
these cities during the Spanish and Mexican periods seem to support
the pueblo water-rights t h e o r y . N o n e t h e l e s s , the legacy of colonial
Spain upon present-day water policy and law is pueblo water rights.
M iner's

and

Farm er's

S ettlem en t

After the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hildalgo,
Anglo-Europeans emigrated to California, bringing with them new

^^Reisner, Cadillac Desert, supra note 21, 55-7, 90-2, and 105-6.
GOLos Angeles has gained exclusive control of the Los Angeles River
watershed through the judicial decree expounding Spanish and Mexican water
law.
But the decrees have ignored the primary focus of Spanish colonial water
law.
Spanish water law protected individuals water rights as much as
com m unity water rights.
Moreover, surrounding comm unities had claim s to
the water under the principle of "equity and justice." For a court cases dealing
with this issue see City of Los Angeles v.City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.
3d 199,
123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250 (1975) or City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co.,
209 Cal. 105, 287 Pac. 475 (1930).
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methods of resource allocation.

The Hispanic experience with aridity

and water-resource allocation, in both the Old and New World,
produced public policy stressing community rights and strong
centralized government.

The newcomers came from relatively

humid landsGi and traditions that valued individual rights and
minimal governmental

in te r fe r e n c e .

^2

The era of central control of

water resources was essentially dead,^^ replaced by a system of
individual water rights, embodied in the Common Law of England.
English Common Law reflected the settlers’ past experiences with
geography, water resources, and socio-economics.

Unfortunately,

contrary to the Spanish experience, neither the geography nor the
resource economics of California related well to the experience of the
Anglo-European immigrants.

As a result, the laws governing the

people and resources were often ill-suited to the needs of the settlers
and they were forced to hastily develop new laws in order to satisfy
their needs.
^ im m ig ra n ts came from England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and
Ireland, as well as from Oregon and the east coast of the United States; lands
where water resources were abundant and could be used without personal
restraint. See Ellen Churchill Semple, American Historv and Its Geographic
C o n d itio n s (Cambridge, England: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1903), 215-19.
Hereafter, Semple, Am erican H istory.
^^Hundley, The Great T hirst, supra note 35, 65. Many individuals fled to
the United States to avoid overbearing governm ents which m aintained control
over natural resources.
People emigrated so that they, as individuals, could
decide their own fate.
Although the Treaty o f Guadalupe-Hildalgo preserved private water
rights and, later, some public water rights founded under M exican and
Spanish water law, the complete power of the central authority was gone. No
longer could the c a lb i d o decide to whom and for what purposes water should be
allocated.
Instead, private individuals used the waters as they saw fit.
G^The Common Law of England was adopted by the early United States
settlers and was therefore, considered the guiding principle of the United
States territories.
The Common Law contained many references to both public
and private rights which will be discussed later in this paper.
See generally,
Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal C ontrol, supra note 56.
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The riparian doctrine was the original water law brought to
California by the northern

E

u r o p e a n s .

The fundamental principle

of riparianism was that the owner of the land bordering a body of
water acquired certain rights to the use of the water.

Distinctions

were made between moving bodies of water, termed riparian, and
stagnant bodies of water, labelled littoral.
rules were identical.

In general, the operative

First, each landowner bordering upon a body of

water could make reasonable use of the water associated with that
parcel of land if the use did not disturb the reasonable uses of other
riparians.

Second, the riparian land owner would maintain the water

right irrespective of whether the water right was

e x e r c is e d .^6

The

two key issues for riparianism were defining which lands were
actually riparian, so that they were entitled to riparian water rights,
and assessing what was considered a reasonable

u s e .^7

Today,

California's riparian waters can be used, allowing some dimunition of
quantity and quality, so long as the challenged use is reasonable
within the totality of the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^8

One carries a riparian

water right, but that right is subject to all of the concerns and
demands of all parties remaining in the system.

Therefore, under

this policy, water has a community value in addition to its
commodity value,

^^David H. Getches, W ater Law. 2d. ed., (St. Paul Minnesota:
Publishing Co., 1990), 14-46. Hereafter, Getches, W ater Law .

West

66ibid.

^^Ibid.
56, 37-65.

See also Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal C ontrol, supra note

GSibid.
G^The idea o f protecting “third-party interests’* is reem erging as the
preem inant issue in water-resource allocation and will be covered in detail in
later chapters o f this paper.
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The early California settlers used riparian water law because
they were familiar with its tenets and it was applicable to their
predominant land uses.

Following the Spanish example, ranchers

raised cattle along the seemingly endless riparian grasslands of the
coastal regions and the Central Valley.

Successful cattle ranching

required a steady supply of pasture and a dependable source of
water.

Huge tracts of grassland were monopolized along lakes and

streams, securing extensive water rights as written in the English
Common Law.

The usufruct water rights gave ranchers unimpeded

liberty to use the water as long as they maintained the “natural flow’
of the rivers.70

Thus, the riparian doctrine simulated Indian and

Spanish water law in its concern for community equity, yet the right
was not truly held and administered by the community.

Instead, it

obliged each riparian land holder to preserve the water resource for
the good of the public.71

In reality, the sparse settlements and vast

land holdings allowed ranchers to degrade water without injuring
other human parties.

Water was not considered a scarce resource,

and the mechanisms of degradation were not

u n d ersto o d .7 2

Unfortunately, this ignorance, combined with the gold rush and the

7 0 Natural flow meaning that they did not impede the quantity or quality
of the flow. In reality, nobody new what the natural flow was. For more
information on natural flow see generally Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, L e g al
C o n tro l, supra note 56, 37-134.
71 This natural flow was later interpreted to mean m aintaining
navigability of the river.
Navigation is one of the primary issues in
controversies between public and private rights and will be discussed in detail
later in the paper.
72[)onald Worster, Rivers of Empire: .Water Aridity and the Growth of
the
American West (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 22-29. Hereafter,
Worster, R iv e r s.
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subsequent population growth, eliminated the functional successes of
the riparian system of water rights.
The discovery of gold in 1848 at Sutter’s Mill ignited a chain of
events that changed California’s water law forever.

For the first time

in California’s history, the gold-seeking placer miners started a new
demographic trend:
s u p p lie s .

73

they settled away from natural water

Water resources were located in areas where the miners

could not use them for the purposes that they wanted and, hence,
riparian water rights had to be rejected.

For one thing, the miners

did not own the majority of land that they mined.

The public land

had been ceded by Mexico to the United States government after the
Mexican-American war.

Since the miner’s were essentially

trespassers on the public lands, riparian rights would not have
benefitted them because they would not have had any legal right to
the water that they were using.

Second, the places in which the

miners needed to use water were not riparian lands and were often
located quite a distance away from sources of water.

Miners were

forced to

adjust to the

environment and manipulate its resources as

best they

could for thesocial and economic purposes they and

society desired.
Since California was not a state in 1849, there was no local
government to enforce the rules of English Common Law.74
Nevertheless, the miner’s needed some form of administrative forum
to protect their interests as mining techniques evolved from simple
73Douglas R. Littlefield, “Water Rights during the California Gold Rush:
Conflicts over Economic Points of View,” The W estern Historical Quarterly 14
(October 1983): 415. Hereafter Littlefield, "Water Rights."

74ibid.
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river panning to complex hydraulic works.

The Doctrine of Prior

Appropriation emerged as the governing rule of both mining and
water

r i g h t s .75

Water adjudication replicated the system of the

public domain in mining rights in that it required the newcomers to
post notices of their water claims and record them with the district
clerks; it settled disputes with reference to priority claim; and it
subjected water rights to loss by waste or

n o n - u s e .76

The “posted

notices” required miners to list the amount of water claimed; the
means of diversion, the date of the claim, and the place of use; the
purpose of use; and the name of the right holder.

Furthermore,

implicit in the miners' adoption of prior appropriation was the fact
that they separated water rights from land rights, allowing transfers
of water over great distances.

Prior appropriation was a mining law

created and upheld by miners to protect their interests, as they
helped themselves to the land, gold, and water under rules and
regulations of their own

m a k in g .77

Given the importance of mining to the state, many Californians,
especially miners, assumed that appropriative water rights were
synonymous with mining rights, just as riparian rights were
associated with riparian lands and agriculture.

As Douglas Littlefield

stated, “While the phrase ‘by priority’ suggests that the miners were
claiming prior appropriation, the rest of the petition indicates that
they felt entitled to water by virtue of their occupation—with ‘by
75ibid., see also, Worster, R iv ers, supra note 72, 89-99.
76Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western W aters (Lincoln,
Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 59-72.
77W illiam E. Colby, “The Freedom of the Miner and its influence on
Water Law," Legal Essays. (1935): 67-84 taken from Littlefield, "Water Rights,"
supra note 73.
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priority’ meaning ‘first in right’ because they were miners, and not
necessarily 'first in time.'”78
dissented.

Yet, there were those who openly

First, the corporate hydraulic mines, which required

tremendous amounts of water for their operations, eventually
monopolized water rights on smaller streams to the detriment of the
small mining claims.

Second, water companies acquired numerous

water rights and sold them to miners in an open market for a profit.
Miners threatened and boycotted water financiers, even destroying
many dams and flumes while water-company officials responded by
lobbying California’s Legislature to formally recognize their interests.
Both sides took disputes to court and attempted to make the legal
process conform to their point of view.

Eventually, the courts

decided that water rights were separate and distinct from mining
rights and, in 1872, twenty-two years after California was granted
statehood, the Legislature gave prior appropriation statutory
recognition.79
Obviously, there were sharp differences between the values
and needs of California's previous occupants and those of the miners
of 1849.

As Norris Hundley commented, the Doctrine of Prior

Appropriation “resembled Hispanic water law in its emphasis on use
as the decisive consideration for developing a region; but unlike the
Hispanic practices, it grounded water rights on personal initiative.

78Littlefield, "Water Rights," supra note 73, 423.
7*The major cases that led to the official adoption of prior appropriation
were: Eddy v. Simpson 3 Cal. 249 (1853); Irwin v. Phillips 5 Cal. 140 (1855);
Hoffman v. Stone 7 Cal. 46 (1857). The statute that fostered prior appropriation
was soon eliminated from the California W ater Code, but the legacy of these
cases is that they forced the legislature to acknowledged the doctrine's
acceptance in the California .
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not on an imperial decree or administrative
had three fundamental axioms;
land rights.

o r d e r .” ^0

The doctrine

First, it separated water rights from

Second, it allowed interbasin transfers.

required water to be put to a beneficial use.^i

Finally, it

In water adjudication

disputes, priority, rather than equity or justice, was the main
concern, and public interests were rarely, if ever, considered.

The

system reflected distaste for activist government, preference for
local decision-making, and emphasis upon individual enterprise.
To complicate matters, California’s population was growing
rapidly while awareness of limited water resources was spreading.
In 1850, California's population stood at 100,000; by 1852 it had
increased to over 200,000.^2

Each year, from 1852 to 1900, the

population increase was from a minimum of 18,000 to a maximum of
35,000 people.83

The first settlers were overflow settlers from

O regon,84 and the second set were drawn to California by gold.

But

the next generation came to take advantage of economic
opportunities in the rapidly expanding cities or for the opportunity
to obtain land.85

In fact, by 1870, the basis of Northern California

settlement had shifted from mining to agriculture.86 As long as
settlement was sparse, non-miners did not share the miners’
concerns over water allocation—the pattern of isolated communities
8^^Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35,
81 Getches, Water Law, supra note 65, 82-5.
82Hornbeck, California Patterns, supra note
California Water Atlas, supra note 5.
83lbid.
84sem ple, American History, supra note 61,
85Hornbeck, California Patterns, supra note
California Water Atlas, supra note 5.
86lbid., 66.

72.
11,65.

See also Kahrl,

215-19.
11,70. Also see Kahrl,
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upon bodies of water, separated by vast tracts of arid and semi-arid
lands, changed as immigrant farmers filled in the gaps.
increased while available riparian lands decreased.

Settlement

Moreover,

completion of the transcontinental railway, the invention of the
refrigerator car, the development of commercial grain farming, and
the production of highly valued fruit crops reaffirmed the value of
limited water resources and heightened the demand for interbasin
transfers and the elimination of riparianism.
Water’s role in society came into question as the geographical
patterns of settlement and the cultural needs of Californians changed.
Agricultural and urban settlements were rapidly growing in areas far
removed from natural surface-water r e s o u r c e s . E x p l o s i v e urban
population increase and concerns about steady water supplies ignited
heated debates throughout the state upon how to supply and
augment water resources.

Appropriators opposed

rip a ria n s,

Kahrl, California W ater Atlas, supra note 5, 14.
settlem ents were diverting water out of watersheds in direct
conflict with the riparian principle o f natural flow.
Prior appropriation and
riparianism were simply incomparable.
The first significant case pitting
riparian against appropriator was the Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 1857, which
held that the non-mining riparian property holder was entitled to riparian
water rights. For brief see A. Dan Tar lock, James N. Corbridge, Jr., and David H.
Getches. Water Resource Management A Casebook in Law and Public Policv.
4th ed., (Westbury, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1993), 158. Hereafter
Tarlock, Corbridge,
and Getches, W ater R esource M anagem ent. Later, in the
famous Lux v. Haggin dispute of 1866, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the legal preem inence o f riparian rights.
Riparian rights were soon subject
to priority as established by the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation.
Another
m ajor definition o f the relationship between riparian and appropriative
rights occurred in
1928 in the case Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison
Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926). The fallout from this case led to the adoption
o f Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution in 1928, which states that
all waters o f the state must be used “reasonably and beneficially.” This
standard requires that all water resources must be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent o f which they are capable, and waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method o f use of water must be prevented.
One court stated that
“whether a use is reasonable' or not depends upon all the facts and
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preservationists

denounced

d e v e lo p e r s ,89

and public interests

challenged private water r i g h t s . I t was the beginning of a new era
in California’s hydrogeography, characterized by competition among
multiple private and public interests in water resources.
The cultural interpretation of water resources by all of
California’s past inhabitants were as diverse as its physical
environment.

The one common thread, however, was the need for a

steady supply of fresh water for every individual.

Native Americans

recognized the importance of preserving nature in order to sustain
their livelihood and would fiercely protect their resources from
outside influences for the benefit of their small communities.
circumstances o f a particular case and can, and will, change over time to best
meet the needs of the public." For an overview of the Herminhaus case see
Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56, 353-354.
8^In order to deter conflict, many developers believed that the water
problem s could be overcome by increasing supplies, transferring water from
places of plenty to place o f deficit. There are several topics worth
investigating in this era of water-resource development.
The developm ent of
Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles in 1913, the construction o f Hetch
Hetchy in the Sierra Nevadas for San Francisco's municipal supply (against
the strong objections o f John Muir and the Sierra Club), the development of
the Colorado River, and construction of the State W ater Project and the Central
Valley Project. All o f these were hotly contested by a variety of pubiicinterest groups, including preservationists, conservationists, and developers.
Many of the same issues that were contested then have been revived and are
currently being debated. For a good overview of the issues see Kahrl,
C alifornia W ater A tlas, supra note 5.
^^Since the earliest settlem ents in California, competing public
interests and competing private interests have been a major source of
controversy.
Native Californians fought to preserve the water in their
territories.
The Spanish had public interest conflicts among presidios,
m issions, and pueblos.
The Anglo-Californians have had to preserve water
resources first for navigation, then for recreation, and now for
environm ental and aesthetic concerns.
It is im portant to rem em ber that
public interests are often in direct conflict with private rights.
In an early
attem pt at a more orderly method of authorizing use o f unappropriated waters,
the California Legislature approved the Water Commission Act of 1913
establishing a perm it process to control surface w ater appropriations hoping
to derail some o f the public-interest problems. The Act created a state agency
(now the State W ater Resources Control Board) and authorized it to administer
the perm it process.
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Although the Spanish were aware of some of the state's hydrological
variability, they chose to ignore environmental preservationism,
focusing their concerns upon "consumptive use."

Benefit could only

be gained if water resources were used by individuals for productive
community purposes, such as farming and ranching.

Finally, the

Forty-Niners removed community responsibility from the individual
by separating land and water rights.

This mining philosophy allowed

water to be transported out of natural channels, over great distances,
for any personal use.

The legacy of these three cultures have been

the focus of controversy in California's water policy and law for the
last 100 years.
Today, the more than thirty million people that currently
inhabit California^i consume, on average, over forty billion gallons of
water every

d a y . 92

The majority of the population has settled in

large urban areas that are either located far away from usable water
sources or have maximized the development of their surrounding
water supplies.

In fact, seventy percent of California's natural

surface-water supplies lie north of the latitude of Sacramento, while
eighty percent of the state's population, along with most of its
irrigated agriculture and industry, lies south of that latitude^) (fig. 6)
Thus, the focus has been upon augmenting supply through water
transfers by moving water from places of surplus to places of deficit.
Californians have built 1251 major reservoirs (table 2) and
millions of smaller canals and ditches to redistribute water
91 Hart. California W ater Plan Update. Vol. I. supra note 10, 145ff.
92United States Geological Survey, "Estimated Use of W ater in the United
States in 1985 (1988).
93Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 1-12
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Figure 6.

A V ER A G E ANNUAL
W A T ER SURPLUS
Less than 8 in. (20cm)
8-24 in. (20-60cm)
(60-100cm)
24-40 in.
More than 40 in.
(1 0 0 c m )
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Table 2.
R e s e r v o ir
Name
C lear L ake
T ahoe
C lear L ake
H etch H etch y
S h av er L ake
A lm a n o r
B u ck s
P a rd ee
S alt S p rings
E l C ap itan
H avasu
M a tth e w s
C ro w le y
P ra d o
S h a s ta
M ille r to n
I s a b e lla
C achum a
E d is o n
Pine F lat
F o ls o m
L lo y d
N a c im in to
B e rry e ssa
T w itc h e ll
W is h o n
C o u r t r ig h t
C a s ita s
L ake M en d o cin o
M am m o th P o o l
C lair E agle
K aw eah
B lack B utte
C am p F ar W est
U nion V alley
C am anche
W h is k e y to w n
N ew H ogan
San A n to n io
F re n c h M e ad o w s
H ell H ole

Major Surface Water Reservoirs in California
H ydrologie
Region

Capacity
lOOO's o f AF

NC
ML
SR
SF
SJ
SR
SR
SJ
SJ
SC
CD
SC
SL
SC
SR
SJ
TL
CC
SJ
TL
SR
SJ
CC
SR
CC
TL
TL
SC
NC
SJ
NC
TL
SR
SR
SR
SJ
SR
SJ
CC
SR
SR

527
732
313
360
135
1308
106
210
139
113
619
179
183
201
4552
520
568
205
125
1000
974
268
340
1600
240
128
123
254
122
122
2448
143
144
104
271
417
241
317
330
136
208

Owner
USBR
USBR
YCFCWCD
SF
SCE
PG & E
PG & E
EBMUD
PG & E
SD
USBR
MWD
LADW P
USCE
USBR
USBR
USCE
USBR
SCE
USCE
USBR
SF
MCW A
USBR
USBR
PG & E
PG & E
USBR
USCE
SCE
USBR
USCE
USCE
SSWD
SMUD
EBMUD
USBR
USCE
M CW A
PCWA
PCW A
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Table 2.

continued
Capacity

Owner

R e s e r v o ir
Name

Hydrologie
Region

lOOO's o f AF

N ew E x ch q u e r
San Luis
O ro v ille
N ew B ullards B ar
S ta m p e d e
N ew D on P edro
C a s ta ic
P y r a m id
P e r r is
B uchanan
In d ian V a lle y
N ew M elones
L ake S onom a
N ew S p icer
M eadow s

SJ
SJ
SR
SR
NL
SJ
SC
SC
SC
SJ
SR
SJ
NC

1025
2039
3538
966
226
2030
324
171
131
150
300
2420
381

M ID
USBR
DW U
YCWA
USBR
T ID -M ID
DW R
DW R
DW R
USCE
YCFCWCD
USBR
USCE

SJ

190

CCW D

Reservoir owners listed
CCWD:
DWR:
EBMUD:
LADWP:
MCWA:
MID:
MWD:
PCWA:
PG&E:
SCE:
SD::
SF:
SMUD:
SSWD:
TID-MID:
USCE:
USBR:
YCFCWCD:
YCWA:

Calaveras County Water District
California Department of Water Resources
East Bay Municipal Utilities District
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
Monterey County Water Agency
Merced Irrigation District
Metropolitan Water District
Placer County Water Agency
Pacific Gas and Electric
Southern California Edison Company
City of San Diego
City of San Francisco
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
South Sutter Water District
Turlock Irrigation Dist. and Modesto Irrigation Dist.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conserv. Dist.
Yuba County Water Agency
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throughout the

s t a t e . ^4

Today, only the Eel, Mad, Mattole, Smith, and

part of the Klamath River in the northwest corner of the state remain
essentially in their pre-European condition (fig. 7).

Federal and state

authorities transport water to nearly every corner of the state
through a complex system of pumps, siphons, reservoirs, and canals.
The federal Central Valley Project (GYP), which began deliveries in
1951, moves water from regions north of the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta to the southern end of the San Joaquin Valley.

In

1959, Californians appropriated funds for the State Water Project
(SWP) which now transports water south through the San Joaquin
Valley, up 3000 feet over the Tehachapi Mountain Range, and into
the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area.^5

The modifications of

the natural environment and the accompanying infrastructure are
monumental in size and scope, covering over five-hundred miles of
land and redistributing over thirty-five MAP of water every year.^^
Nevertheless, the supply is apparently not enough, as the urban,
industrial, agricultural, and environmental interests bitterly compete
for California’s water resources.
By far, agriculture uses the majority of California’s developed
surface- and ground water resources, totalling over forty-nine MAP
of water per year; thirty-seven MAP of surface water and twelve
MAP of ground water.^^

On the other hand, urban and

environmental interests require an additional eight MAP of water

^^Reisner, Cadillac Desert, supra note 21, 9
^^H ornbeck, C alifornia P attern s, supra note 11,78.
^^Hart, California W ater Plan U pdate. Vol. I, supra note 10, 6.
97ibid. at 48, 75. and 86.
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Figure 7.

%
MAJOR WATER PROJECTS
Local Water Projects
State or Federal Water
P rojects

o

h
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per y e a r . A d d i n g to the scarcity concerns is the fact that
California’s population is rapidly expanding and is expected to reach
fifty million people by the year

2020

^^ (table 3).

If current

consumption rates are maintained, urban and environmental
demands are expected to increase by 6.5 MAF to at least 14.5 MAF,
representing an eighty-two percent increase in demand for fresh,
usable water.^00

Satisfying this demand would require the

agriculture industry to reduce its consumption by a scant thirteen
percent, freeing the water for redistribution.

From an economic

standpoint, water is not becoming increasingly scarce; cheap water is.
Therefore, one can assert that the p e r c e iv e d scarcity of water is a
direct result of poor water-resource

m a n a g e m e n t.!o i

^^Ibid. at 48, 75, and 86. Minimum stream flows are exempted from this
calculation because the SW RC6 in conjunction with the state Legislature has
exempted a certain portion of "instream flows" from adjudication.
Thus, these
minimum flows are a substantial portion o f the annual runoff.
^^Tim Palmer, "A Great Number of People," Californians T hreatened
Environm ent Restoring the Dream (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993), 22.
See also David W. Lantis, Rodney Steiner, and Arthur E. Karinen, C a lifo rn ia :
The Pacific Connection (Chico, California: Creekside Press, 1989), 6-8, 536-43.
!^®Hart, California W ater Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 11.
! (! ! Three prim ary agencies oversee C alifornia's water allocation system.
They are the United States Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of W ater
Resources, and the State Water Resources Control Board. According to the
Coordinated Operation Agreement (CCA) of 1986, these three agencies are
responsible for co-managing C alifornia's complex water system.
The
diversification o f public and private interests combined with the com plexity of
the adm inistration and the magnitude o f the water transfers has created a
b u rea u cra tic w ater nightm are.
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Table 3.
Urban Population by Hydrologie Region (in millions)
H y d r o lo g ie
R e g io n

1990

2000

2010

2020

North Coast

0.6

0.7

0.8

1.3

San Francisco
Central Coast

5.5

6.2

6.6

7

1.3

1.5

1.8

2.2

South Coast

16.2

19.3

22.1

25.5

Sacramento River
San Joaquin River

2.2

2.9

3.5

1.4

2

2.6

5.1
3.3

Tulare Lake
North Lahontan

1.6

2.2

2.8

3.5

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

South Lahontan

0.6

1

1.4

2

Colorado River

0.5

0.6

0.8

1.1

30

36.5

42.5

51.1
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CHAPTER 4
WATER TRANSFERS
When affordable water becomes scarce, conflicts over access
begin to develop and new water allocation processes must evolve.
Water is said to be scarce when there is no longer enough available
to allow all public and private interests to have as much as they
want without giving up something else of value in order to obtain it.
Consequently, some allocative decisions must be made regarding who
will have access to water resources, and under what conditions . ^ 0 2
In California, water scarcity has resulted from a growth in industrial,
urban, and environmental demands, coupled with an insufficient
supply of free-flowing unappropriated waters. 1^3

The expansion of

environmentalism, for instance, has not only prevented new waterstorage facilities from being developed, but simultaneously imposed
substantial demands upon previously allocated s u p p l i e s . I n 1993,
1 0 2 Bonnie G. Colby, Mark A. McGinnis, and Ken A. Rait, “Mitigating
E nvironm ental E xternalities through V oluntary and Involuntary W ater
Reallocation;
Nevada’s Truckee-Carson River Basin,” N atural R esources
Jo u rn al 31 (Fall 1991): 760. Hereafter Colby, McGinnis, and Rait "Mitigating
E n v iro n m ental E x te rn alities."
^OSgonnie Colby Saliba and David B. Bush, W ater Markets in Theorv and
P ra ctice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), 4-7. Hereafter, Saliba,
W ater M arkets.
104por example, when the federal governm ent listed the fall-run
Chinook Salmon and the Delta Smelt as endangered species, more water had to
be allocated from both the federal and state water projects to support these
ailing populations.
M oreover, many o f the normal m anagement functions of
the m ajor water projects such as timing o f releases had to be altered which
further reduced supplies to areas south o f the delta during certain times of
y e a r.
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these realizations led Governor Pete Wilson to endorse this statement
issued by the Department of Water Resources:
C alifornia’s population continues to grow, while dependable
w ater supplies dim inish... Prospects for developing
substantial

additional

water

supply

through

(such as new reservoirs) are slim at best.

any

traditional

means

In this stressful

clim ate, increasing attention and hopes are focusing on water
tr a n s f e r s . ^ ®^

Thus, if growing industrial, urban, and envrionmental demands are
to be met, either voluntary or involuntary transfers of water among
competing uses will be necessary.
Water transfers have been commonplace since the earliest
settlement of California.

Indians, colonialists, and miners all

transferred water by diverting or changing the type of water use
associated with their basic needs.

Agriculturalists transferred water

through diversion ditches to irrigate crops and provide pasture for
cattle, while gold seekers moved water over great distances for
hydraulic mining.

One court even stated that “the right to

appropriate water predates recorded

h isto ry .”

^0 7

Although there are

many similarities between California’s ancient and contemporary
appropriators, the principal difference between the Anglo-European’s
transfers and the Spanish and Indian transfers was that the latter

lOSDepariment of W ater Resources of California, “W ater Transfers in
California:
Translating Concept into R eality,” (November 1993), 7.
Hereafter
D epartm ent of W ater Resources, "Water Transfers."
David Kennedy (Director
o f DWR) and Douglas P. Wheeler (Secretary of Resources) also endorsed the
b o o k le t.
106George A. Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights," Natural R esources
Tournai 2 9 , (1 9 8 9 ):
458.
Hereafter Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights."
107ciough V. Wing 2 Ariz. 3 7 1 , 3 8 0 , 17 P. 4 5 3 , 4 5 5 (1 8 8 8 )
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generally limited their transfers to other similar users within a single
w atershed.
From the inception of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation, a
water right has been a transferable property interest.!09

During the

Gold Rush, for example, when a miner wanted to transfer a water
right, he or she altered the diversion and then reported the changes
to the county courthouse.

If no other miner could prove injury, then

the water transfer remained intact.

Several legislative and judicial

decisions treated a water right granted under prior appropriation as
a property interest independent of land and, therefore, as
independently

transferable.!!0

jn fact, providing water to others

was itself considered to be a beneficial use, and thus a legitimate
profit-making enterprise.

Profits from individual and cooperative

ditches mainly came from gold, and secondly from selling excess
water to other miners.! ü

Larger transfer efforts reversed this order,

with profits derived primarily from selling water to m iners.!!2
Nevertheless, all of these uses and transfers were protected by the
Doctrine of Prior Appropriation.
After the Gold Rush, as Californians rapidly settled the coast
and interior valleys, water transfers grew in both scope and scale.
!^®A. Dan Tarlock, “New W ater Transfer Restrictions: The W est Returns
to R iparianism ,” W ater Resources Research 27 (June 1991): 990. Hereafter
Tarlock "New W ater Transfer Restrictions."
These transfers usually occurred
with a change in goals of the group. For example, the water from the streams
or lakes served multiple interests. Depending on the time of year or the
im portance o f certain interests, water was transferred to accom odate those
i n te r e s ts .
!09Getches, W ater Law, supra note 65, 82-5.
llOM aeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 261, 261 (1857); McDonald v. Bear River Co.,
13 Cal. 220, 232 (1859).
! ! ! Littlefield, "Water Rights," supra note 73, 421.
! 12j bi d.

5 1

San Francisco and Los Angeles transferred water from hundreds of
miles away to quench their growing t h i r s t s , w h i l e the farmers of
the Central Valley developed land and erected diversion ditches to
provide pasture for cattle and irrigate crops.

Historically, one of the

most famous examples of a water transfer was the purchase of tens
of thousands of acres of agricultural land and its associated water
rights in the Owens River Valley by the City of Los Angeles shortly
after the turn of the c e n t u r y . T h e ensuing devastation of the
valley and the later extension of the project into the Mono Basin
evoked strong reactions from

C a lifo rn ia n s.

1

Later, in 1933, responding to increased agricultural demands
for water, the voters of California authorized the Central Valley
Project, which, after construction, was the largest federally funded
water-transfer project in the United S t a t e s . U p o n its completion
in 1958, the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) offered
approximately 7.5 MAF per year of water-rights permits to the
llS S e e generally, Donald J. Pisani, From the Family Farm to
A gribusiness. The Irrigation Crusade in California and the W est (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984). Hereafter, Pisani, Fam ily F arm . See also
Reisner, Cadillac D esert, supra note 21, 54-57, 62-107, and 344-47.
^Harrison C. Dunning, "Dam Fights and W ater Policy in California:
1Q<SQ-1 Q8Q." Journal of the West
29 (July 1990):
25. Hereafter, Dunning, "Dam
F ig h ts."
1 l5Sce Reisner, Cadillac D esert, supra note 21. See Hundley, The Great
T h irst, supra note 35.
ll^ T h e Central Valley Project was voted upon by Californians in 1933.
Since the nation was soon in a deep depression, the state could not pay for the
development of the project.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt stepped in with the
“New D eal” and funded the project, making it an exclusively federal water
project managed by the Bureau o f Reclamation.
Recently, the lack of control
by the state of California over the Central Valley Project has caused
considerable tension between the Department o f W ater Resources and the
Bureau o f Reclam ation, especially since new federal environm ental
regulations have been enacted.
In 1990, in an effort to simplify the water
m anagem ent system . Governor W ilson attempted to have the federal
governm ent relinquish control o f the project, but his efforts failed.
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United States Bureau of Reclamation, which then divided the water
among various irrigation districts in the Central V alley.11*7 These
rights allowed the federal government to move substantial quantities
of water over four-hundred miles from northern to central California
solely for the benefit of agricultural development.^

One can see

that water transfers have had a long history in both the private and
public sectors of California's society.
Despite the foregoing examples, historically there have been a
number of impediments to the free transfer of water rights.

For one

thing, the California Supreme Court has always held that the transfer
of a water right could not result in injury to other (junior)
appropriators. 1

Thi s holding has not only made the initial use of

water the measure of the right which could be transferred, but has
also protected all appropriative-rights holders from irresponsible
water users.

Thus, transfers which would increase consumption,

decrease return flows, or in any way change the availability of water
to junior appropriators were prohibited or were designed to
eliminate these effects. 1 2 0

Likewise, on the larger scale, the

legislature enacted statutes designed to protect “areas of origin” from
Hart, California W ater Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 6.
1 Agricultural development was seen by many members of the federal
government as the way to halt the depression. By the time the project was
completed, the depression was over and California had become one of the
primary economic and social centers in the United States.
The rapid urban and
industrial developm ent of southern California would prove to be the next great
hurdle in the water allocation game.
ll^ K id d V, Laird, 15 Cal. 162, 181 (1860). A junior appropriator has less
seniority than a senior appropriator.
Each water right is based on priority.
However, some junior water rights are directly affected by senior water use.
Thus, even though the water is privately used, the water user often holds a
public obligation to continue to use his water in the same manner as he always
has. This topic will be covered in detail later in the paper.
120GouId, "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 459-460.
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economic collapse and environmental degradation resulting from
water transfers. 121

Such prohibitions still protect the rights of junior

appropriators and the resources of water-supply areas.
The Prior Appropriation Doctrine evolved in response to
economic scarcity, as water users realized that an allocative process
was needed to settle conflicts and facilitate the orderly use of water
resources. 1 2 2

The contemporary motives for water reallocation

through water transfers hardly differ from those of the earliest
Californians:

the people and the government want water to be used

for its most beneficial purposes.

Unfortunately, disagreements

abound among individuals and public interest groups as to what a
beneficial use is.

Since cultural homogeneity no longer exists in

California, and abusive water uses cannot be tolerated, maximizing
water-use efficiency is a preeminant objective of California’s citizens
and government.

Therefore, the question is:

what institutions or

processes of decision-making will lead to equitable water allocations
and so should be favored, as opposed to procedures or practices that
could lead to inequitable allocations?^ 23
As noted above, 124 Charles Howe has outlined five
characteristics desirable in water-allocation processes:

flexibility,

secure expectations, opportunity costs, predictability, and fairness.
Water transfers require changes in places of use or types of use of

California W ater Code § 1245 (West Supplement 1995).
122colby, McGinnis, and Rait "Mitigating Environmental Externalities,"
supra note 102, 760.
123Jack Hirshleifer, James C. DeHaven, and Jerome W. Milliman, W a te r
Supply:
Econom ics. Technology, and Policy (1960): 36-42. Hereafter,
Hirshleifer, et. al., WatCt Supply.
124 how c , et. al, "Innovative Approaches," supra note 4, 438-45.
121
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water rights.

These reallocations can be accomplished in two ways:

through involuntary measures, such as forced redistribution of
certain quantities of water by judicial or legislative decree; or
through voluntary measures, such as the free-trade of existing water
r i g h t s . 125

In either case, the dual nature of water as a common-

property resource intertwined with private property rights make it
not only a necessary prerequisite for the development and
maintenance of the economy and social structure which make a
society possible, but a commodity to be bought, sold, and

m o v e d . 126

Any contemporary reallocations resulting from water transfers must
consider both public and private interests.

125Tarlock "New Water Transfer Restrictions," supra note 108, 987.
126Victor Brajer and Wade E. Martin, “Water Rights Markets Social and
Legal Considerations:
R esource's ‘Com m unity’ Value, Legal Inconsistencies
and Vague Definition and Assignment o f Rights Color Issues,” A m e ric a n
Journal o f Economics _ and Sociology 49 (January 1990).
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CHAPTER 5
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The Public Trust Doctrine has emerged as the principal agent of
involuntary water transfers in California.

The doctrine declares that

the state, as sovereign, took title to tidelands and the beds of nontidal navigable water at the time that it was admitted to the union,
holding trust over certain resources associated with these lands,
which are the property of

a ll. 127

it

is

the state's duty to exercise

continued supervision over these lands and the water above them
for the benefit of the

p eo p le.

128

Entities acquiring exclusive private

rights in navigable streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands,
generally hold those rights in conflict with the public trust, since
they permit only limited access to the resource.

Conversely, the

Public Trust Doctrine does not limit public access to any resources

127Who exactly “air* is meant to represent is extrem ely controversial.
To some people, the "public" is considered to be only those who live in
California.
However, others would argue that the public is bounded by
nationality, while still others would say that the public includes all human
beings on the planet.
Identifying the “public” in the Public Trust Doctrine
could have profound impacts upon the outcome of public trust decisions.
128por the original insight into the contemporary Public Trust Doctrine
see Joseph L. Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention,” M ichigan Law Review 68 (Jan. 1970): 471566.
Hereafter, Sax, "Effective Judicial Intervention."
For an opposing view
see James L. Huffman, “Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on
the Public Trust W ritings of Professors Sax, W ilkinson, Dunning, and
Johnson,” Denver Universitv Law Review 63 (1986): 565-584. Hereafter
Huffman "Trusting the Public Interest."
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deemed within its bounds.

In other words, public or private rights

acquired in public-trust resources cannot be placed entirely beyond
the direction and control of the public at large.
In discussions of water reallocation, the Public Trust Doctrine
gives the public the authority, through the courts, to reclaim water
resources previously granted as public or private usufruct water
rights.

Usufruct water rights mean that since the property right is

vested in another, a person or entity has the right of enjoying the
profit, utility, and advantage that the use of the water may
p r o d u c e .

129

in California, all water rights are vested in either the

state government, the federal government, or the Native
A m e r i c a n s . 130

These state and federal authorities retain the power

to revoke usufruct water rights from water users for any reason, at
any time, and without compensation.

Therefore, a private usufruct

right is secure as long as it does not infringe upon the public
interests.

If it does oppose these interests, then the Public Trust

Doctrine authorizes non-compensatory water readjudication, even if
the action injures the private party.

This is called “involuntary

reallocation.”

129Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law D ictionary. 5th ed., (St. Paul,
Minnesota: W est Publishing Company, 1983), 802. Hereafter, Black, L aw
Dictionarjÿi.
13 0 x ativ e American rights have been generally treated as states when
water resource issues have gone to court. For an overview of Indian Reserved
Water Rights see Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, L egal C ontrol, supra note 56;
Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, W ater Resource M anagem ent, supra note 85;
or Getches, W ater L aw , supra note 65. Other private water rights founded prior
to statehood, such as Pueblo W ater Rights are also exempt from state or federal
control.
The incidences of such rights have been nearly eliminated.
Los
Angeles and San Diego for example still hold pueblo rights but they are
substantially w atered down.
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D octrin e

E volu tion

The California Public Trust Doctrine derives its authority from
Roman and English law. 131

Although public trust practices have been

common to many cultures throughout world history, including
American Indian, Chinese, Nigerian, Spanish, French, and Islamic
communities, the Romans were the first to articulate the public trust
in

w r i t i n g . 132

jn

a .D . 528, the Roman Emperor Justinian, in the

Institutes o f Justinian, designated navigable waterways as public
resources for the purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing.

The

Emperor did not reserve water resources for aesthetic,
environmental, or spiritual purposes, but rather for economic
endeavors and resource consumption. 133

it is logical to assume

therefore, that in Roman society navigable waterways complemented
resource consumption which in turn complemented commerce.
These principles formed the foundation of California’s Public Trust
Doctrine. 134

131 Joseph L. Sax, “Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its
Historical Shackles,” University of California. Davis Law Review 14 (Winter
1980); 185.
132Charles F. Wilkinson, “The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine,” E n v iro n m e n ta l
Law 19 (Spring 1989): 429-430. Hereafter, Wilkinson, "Headwaters."
133peter Birks, Grant Mcleod, and Paul Krueger, Ju stin ian ’s In stitu tes.
(Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press): 55. Hereafter, Birks, Mcleod,
and Krueger, J u s tin ia n s . For a more complete reading of the Institutes of
Justinian see Mommsen, Theodor, Paul Krueger, and Alan Watson, The Digest of
J u s tin ia n .
vol. 1-4,
(Philadelphia Pennsylvania:
University o f Pennsylvania
Press, 1985).
134These laws were first introduced to California when the Spanish
empire colonized Alta California at San Diego in 1519. Spanish and English
water law had been substantially influenced by the Romans.
For more
information see, Meyer. W ater in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
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The Spanish and English recognized the intrinsic value of
navigation, resource consumption, and commerce in their version of
the Public Trust Doctrine as well.

For example, the English public

trust was held by the monarch in all navigable waters subject to the
"ebb and flow" of the

t i d e , 1^5

while those waters not subject to

oceanic tides were available for exclusive ownership.

This dichotomy

reflects either the hydrological naivety of the crown or the
assumption that the resources in non-navigable streams were either
not significant enough to protect for public use or were better used
by private entities.

Nevertheless, the Magna Carta of 1215

distinguished water rights between the jus privatum^ which the
Crown could transfer to individuals in fee ownership, and the ju s
p u b licu m , which the Crown held in trust for the

p u b lic.

1^6 Each rule

allowed private benefits to be gained from water resources on one
hand from private ownership, and on the other from private use.

In

any case, both the Spanish and the English recognized public
interests and private rights in water resources, often leaving a
blurred distinction between the two.
Contrary to the written Roman, Spanish, and English versions of
the Public Trust Doctrine was the unwritten Native American axiom.
Resources were held in trust by a group for the groups’ exclusive use.
The trust interests included a complex interaction among resource
consumption, spiritual enhancement, and environmental protection.
As one Indian said:
There has been a lot said about the sacredness of our land which

135sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal Control, supra note 56, 69f.
136)^ilkinson, "Headwaters," supra note 132, 430-431.
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is our body; and the values of our culture which is our soul; but
water is the blood of our tribes, and if its life-giving flow is
stopped, or it is polluted, all else will die and the many thousands
of years o f our communal existence will come to an end.^^^

The tribal community protected their resources to satisfy their
interests.

Every culture, whether Spanish, English, or Native

American, defines its own public-trust interests depending upon its
interpretation of the role of natural resources in its society.

These

resource interpretations reflect conscious and subconscious beliefs as
to what is important for “their” public.

When environmental

interpretations and other public interests from diverse groups
collide, public-trust interests must also collide.

In those cases, which

interests should the Public Trust Doctrine protect?
Early Anglo-American interests replicated those outlined in the
English Common Law.

Geographically, the sporadic agricultural

settlements on the eastern seaboard reflected landscapes and
resources very similar to those of England, resulting in nearly
universal espousal of English water

la w .

138

The public trust of the

colonies stated that navigable waterways, subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide, were held in trust by the government of each state on
behalf of the public for "fishing, fowling, and

n a v ig a t io n ."139

On the

other hand, westward expansion revealed substantial geographical
differences between water distribution in England and that of the
137American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc.
Indian W ater
Policv in a Changing Environment 2 (1982).
138xhis was riparian water law. For a discussion on the development of
United States water laws from riparianism see Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches,
Watp.r I^(7SOurce M anagem ent, supra note 85 or Sax, Abrams, and Thompson,
T o n tro l. supra note 56.
139Robert Smith,
The Great Pond Ordinance, "Collectivism in Northern
New England." Boston University Law Review 30 (1950).
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new frontier.

Droughts were common and rivers like the

Mississippi, Sacramento, and Columbia were large enough to navigate
but not subject to oceanic tides.

Hence, the people needed new

methods of water allocation and the government required a new
definition of public-trust waterways.

The new rule of "navigable in

fact" allowed specific testing of waterways to determine their
prospects for navigation and other public-trust

in te r e sts.!

40

In the late nineteenth century, the development of California’s
Public Trust Doctrine isolated the concept of “navigable in fact” as the
primary determination of which waters maintained public-water
r ig h ts.!4 i

Rivers were corridors for transportation and commerce,

connecting the booming mining and agricultural economies with the
rest of the world.

Hydrologically, the Californians did not

comprehend the importance of non-navigable stream flow and
ground-water flow in maintaining the navigability of waterways.
Nor did they understand that other outside activities, such as logging,
mining, road building, and urban development, were physically
connected with fluvial morphology and, thus, their public-trust
interests.

To many people, the ability of society to affect navigable

streams through large diversions of non-navigable streams was
limited and seemingly beyond the scope of the technologies and
populations of that time.

Not until 1884, in People v. Gold Run Ditch

140xhe people were faced with an inadequate allocation system which
led to the adoption of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation. As the need to
determine navigability grew, tests were developed such as the log floatation
test where a log floating in a river had to clear the bottom of the stream or else
the stream was not navigable.
Of course, this definition depended upon the
physical characteristics o f the log itself.
141 Sax, Abrams, and Thompson, Legal C ontrol, supra note 56, 532-39, and
563-64.
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& Mining Company, did the California Supreme Court uphold an
injunction prohibiting upstream hydraulic mining with water from
non-navigable streams that impaired navigation on the American
and Sacramento rivers, both navigable rivers. 1^2

The court stopped

private businesses from damaging the public interests of navigation,
commerce, and fishing. 1^3

it is important to note, however, that in

both of these cases, even though the private water rights were
damaging public interests, the court did not strip the appropriators
of their water rights, but, instead, restricted their use.
The decision in the case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois
was the paramount judicial interpretation of the Public Trust
D octrine.

In 1869, the State of Illinois conferred one thousand

acres of Chicago's waterfront on Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central
Railroad.

Four years later, the State of Illinois attempted to revoke

the absolute grant, citing a violation of the public trust.

The court

ruled that the state had no authority to convey certain resources that
were outside its propriety.

In fact, the court stated that even though

the state was free to convey lands that it held in its proprietary
capacity, the lands in question were the common property of the
people of Illinois, "held in trust" by the state, and therefore, outside
government jurisdiction. 1^5

l^^people

V.

jn short, the grant was annulled.

Gold Run Ditch & Mining Company 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152

(1884).
l^^protection of fishing resources was not mentioned in the opinion.
Nonetheless, the ruling helped decrease streams sediment flows which should
have benefited fish populations.
144Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 146 U.S. 387 (1892) For an
overview of the case and its implications see Sax, "Effective Judicial
Intervention," supra note 128, 471-566.
145ibid.
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indicating that neither the state nor any other public or private
agency had control over certain public resources within state
boundaries.
The Illinois decision redefined the scope of America’s Public
Trust Doctrine and the government's role in protecting public-trust
resources.

There were three questions raised by the case.

First,

since the state did not hold authority over the public-trust resources
within its borders, who owned those resources and how were those
resources governed?

Second, which resources were public-trust

resources, and who made that determination?
government disregard its power of eminent

Third, why did the
d o m a in

146 in its efforts

to reclaim the granted public property?
The objective of the Public Trust Doctrine continued to evolve
as the popular perceptions of the values and uses of waterways
changed.

The public trust which had traditionally protected

navigation, commerce, and fisheries now included the right to fish,
hunt, bathe, swim, navigate, and use the bottom of navigable waters
for anchoring, standing, or other

p u r p o s e s . 147

w ithin the last decade,

the California Supreme Court has recognized that uses of public-trust
resources include the preservation of the land, especially tideland, in
its natural state to serve as ecological units for scientific study, as

146Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public use.
In the United States, the power of eminent domain is founded in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The power to take private
property for a public purpose requires the government to furnish "just
compensation" to the owners of the confiscated property. See Black, L a w
D ic tio n a ry , supra note 129, 273.
147Joseph Sax, "Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
Shackles," Universitv of California. Davis Law Review 14 (Winter 1980): 189.
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open space, and as habitat for birds and aquatic

lif e . 148

addition,

before any water can be appropriated, the doctrine requires the
courts and the State Water Resources Control Board to perform a
balancing test to weigh the potential value to society of a proposed or
existing diversions against their impacts on trust

r e s o u r c e s . 149

y ^ e

action which will best protect public-trust values is to be
implemented.

Yet, in administering the public trust, the courts and

the Water Resources Board have been forced to favor one public use
over another.
C on tem porary

P ublic

T rust

Im p lem en tatio n

California's 1983 Supreme Court decision in National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court o f Alpine County^^^ expounded the
developing clash between public interests and private rights in water
resources.

In 1940, the Division of Water Resources (DWR),

predecessor of the State Water Resources Control Board, granted the
Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles a permit
to appropriate virtually the entire flow of four of the five streams
flowing into Mono Lake.

Even though at that time, the DWR

acknowledged that environmental destruction would supervene their
grant, they felt powerless to oppose section 1254 of the California
Water Code which stated, "...declared to be the established policy of
this state that the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest
148Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, W ater R esource M anagem ent, supra
note 85, 447.
1 4 9 jhis regulation has been in the California Water Code § 1255 for a
long time. Only now is it being enforced. I will cover this in detail later in the
p a p e r.
i^Ojsjational Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County 33 Cal.
3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P. 2d 709
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use of

w a t e r . " 151

However, section 1255 of the California Water Code

which also existed at that time authorized the DWR to reject
appropriations “...when in its judgment, the proposed appropriation
would not best conserve the public

in te r e s t.” i5 2

Forty-three years

after the appropriation was approved, the court found that the
diversions from Mono Lake’s tributaries decimated the brine-shrimp
populations, seagull nesting and breeding habitats, and the scenic
beauty of the Mono Lake region.

In addition, the court ruled that

even though the DWR's grant in 1940 was within the bounds of
constitutional and legislative law, it violated the public trust and was
therefore, revocable. 153
The primary dilemma in water-resource allocation is that
it is naturally exclusive.

James L. Huffman wrote that,

“democracy is capable of confirming, as public rights, popular
expectations which have the purpose and effect of
disadvantaging particular segments of

s o c i e t y . ” 154

\n A udu bon ,

the court insisted that one of the Public Trust Doctrine's central
ideas is that public water rights have priority over all private
water rights.

Yet, central to this issue was that Los Angeles’

public right to domestic water was manifested in a private
water right.

The court conceded that:

The prosperity and habitability o f much of this state requires the
diversion o f great quantities o f water from its streams for
purposes

unconnected

to

any

navigation,

151Califomia W ater Code § 1254
152California Water Code § 1255
153Opinion of Justice Broussard in
Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P. 2d 709.
154Huffman, "Trusting the Public

commerce,

fishing.

(West's Supplement 1995).
(West's Supplement 1995).
National Audubon 33 Cal, 3d 419, 189
Interest," supra note 128, 565-584.
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recreation, or ecological use relating to the source stream.

The

state must have the power to grant non-vcsted usufructuary
rights to appropriate water even if diversions harm o t h e r
trust uses.

public

Approval of such diversion without considering all

public trust values, however, may result in needless destruction
of those values.^

There were two competing public interests in this case.

First,

the public interest of protecting Mono Lake from environmental
degradation, and second, the public interest of providing domestic
water to California's largest urban area.

This simple paradox

illustrates that every beneficial and reasonable use of water by one
public- or private-interest group infringes upon the possible
beneficial uses of other public-interest groups.

In contemporary

California, this is especially true since water resources are unevenly
distributed throughout the state and, in many areas, natural supplies
cannot satisfy high demand.

The Public Trust Doctrine allows the

courts to choose which public interests are the most important for
California's citizens.

Should courts decide these questions?

Another important aspect of this case was the geographical
expansion of the public trust water right.

The court stated, "...the

power of the state...ex tends to the revocation of previously granted
rights or to the enforcement of the trust against lands long thought
free of the t r u s t . " T h o s e lands and waters came to include areas
outside navigable streams.

As Justice Broussard wrote.

The course of the Public Trust Doctrine is the state’s authority as

155opinion of Justice Broussard in National Audubon 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P. 2d 709. (emphasis added).

156ibid.
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sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over
the navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying those
waters.

This authority applies to the waters tributary to Mono

Lake...[because]

such diversions harm the interests protected by

the public trust. ^ ^ ^

Not only did the court dictate the public interests protected by the
public trust, but it also expanded the scope of the doctrine to include
all water bodies tributary to navigable water bodies.

This

interpretation expands the doctrine to include all ground water and
surface-water resources connected in any way to the navigable
waterways within state boundaries.
Conflicts between competing public interests are not new to
California.

Each of the 500 aboriginal sibs had their own public

interests in California's water resources.

When those interests were

threatened by other public interests (other groups), they were
fiercely

d e fe n d e d .

1^8

Cultural and economic homogeneity within

each tribe made identifying their public interests simple, while
outside entities represented conflict.

Contrary to the California

Indians, the Spanish and Mexican colonials were not as homogenous.
Water resources were needed by the missions, pueblos, and presidios
for agricultural and domestic uses.

As their populations grew and

demands for water increased, public interests diverged, and cultural
conflicts ensued.

For example, conflicts developed between the

pueblo at Branciforte and the Mission at Santa Cruz for use of the
waters of the San Lorenzo River.

Both were public entities and both

157ibid.
l^^H undley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 23.
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had valid public claims to the water.

The dispute ended when the

upstream mission limited the water supply of the downstream
pueblo to the extent that the occupants of the pueblo were forced to
m o v e .

159 The ca b lid o , or pueblo council, only represented the

pueblo's interests and was, thereby, unable to satisfy the interests of
the mission and resolve the problem.

Therefore, in order for a

central authority to assuage public interests and equitably adjudicate
water resources, cultural homogeneity is essential.

California

advocates the principle that strength in society is a product of
cultural diversity, and central authorities, by their very nature,
cannot represent that diversity.
E x p e c t a t io n s
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state and
federal governments have encouraged water resource manipulation
throughout California’s Anglo history. 160

the gold miners diverted

water for mineral extraction and the farmers and developers
reclaimed

marshlands, the government adopted

the Doctrine of Prior

Appropriation, wrote the Reclamation Act, and privatized resource
extraction on state-owned lands.

Many of these formal actions

eventually exacerbated problems in water resource degradation.!6 1
!59Afeyer, W ater in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43.
lOOReclamation Act o f June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat.388 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-620), The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937 50 Stat.
884. The California Central Valley Project Act § 11100 California W ater Code
(W est’s Supplem ent 1995).
161 Altering the natural flow of stream channels has many substantial
impacts on the hydrological system.
The morphometry of the stream is
completely altered and thus, things related to the morphometry such as size
and amount o f sediment load, ground-water discharge, and erosional ability
are substantially altered as well.
These in turn change the biological make-up
o f the surrounding ecosystem, and can lead to species relocation or extinction.
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Nevertheless, constitutional rights guaranteed domestic and
agricultural consumption while legislative, executive, and judicial
policies were continually implemented, strengthening and
reaffirming exploitative actions and private resource

r i g h t s . 1^2

jn

the name o f the public interest, water-resource exploitation was
encouraged by every level and branch of government.
Since the rules made by legislators and administrators have, in
large part, caused much of California's rampant environmental
destruction, proponents of the Public Trust Doctrine argue that, even
though they have contributed to the problem, we must look to the
courts for our

s a l v a t i o n . 1^3

The central contention in defending the

doctrine is that democracy sometimes does not work and in some
instances democratic decisions are ultimately found to be
unjustifiable.

Instead, the Public Trust Doctrine gains its power

from the free will of the people as it changes through time.

Joseph

Sax stated:
To understand the nature of the public claim on water, it is useful
to look back to a time when the use of water to promote
industrialization was considered a primary, if not exclusive,
public goal.

At that time there were cases recognizing a right to

pollute, but—significantly—not a property right to pollute.

In

other words, when the public interest was seen as prim arily
developmental, people were permitted to use water in the service
of development.

They were not being vested with a private

162Article X, sec. 2 of the California Constitution, the Doctrine of Prior
Appropriation, the Reclamation Act, private water rights in state lands, etc.
163Huffman, "Trusting the Public Interest," supra note 128, 565-584.

164njid.
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property right that could be asserted against that interest when
public

goals changed.^

The central contradiction here is that if the majority of people think
that pollution is warranted, then it is.

But if the representative

government, acting as the operational mechanism of the people,
thinks pollution is warranted, then it is not.
The very purpose of a government's existence is to serve the
public interest while simultaneously protecting the private citizen's
r i g h t s . T h e Public Trust Doctrine eliminates the natural
assumption that the government is acting on behalf of the people.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, some supporters believe
that the people are powerless to change the principles represented
by the government when their interests are challenged.

In a

functioning democracy, public authorities articulate the public
interest through legislative action.

What logical interpretations

conclude that the counter-majoritarian courts by dictating
noncommittal public interests are protecting public interests from
the democratic legislature?

If people want change, then they have

the obligation as individuals to create change through democratic
institutions.
The expectations that people hold about their government and
the laws that the government hold in their interest is a central figure
in understanding uncertainty in California's water-resource
allocation.

As seen in the Audubon case, the California Water Code

states that the most beneficial use of water is for domestic purposes.
IGSjoseph L. Sax, “The Limits o f Private Rights in Public W aters,”
E nvironm ental Law 19 (Spring 1989): 476.
l^^Huffman, "Trusting the Public Interest," supra note 128:

565-66.
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the next highest use is for agriculture, and all other uses are subject
to those uses.167

The diversity of interests, as written in the law,

precludes a central authority from spontaneously defining the
primary public interest at any point in time.

"Words are the signals

that inform people of their rights and responsibilities.

Therefore, it

is important to the satisfaction of reasonable expectations that the
Public Trust Doctrine be interpreted by courts as it is understood by
ordinary people." 168

The Public Trust Doctrine violates these

expectations since all existing water rights which adversely impact
public-trust values (whatever those might be at a given point in
time) are now subject to reconsideration and modification by a court
in the name of the public trust. 169

Thus, the Public Trust Doctrine

finds its power in the governments' and peoples’ refusal to abide by
previously stated and supported law.
Modifying previously granted water rights, under the guise of
the public trust, means forsaking previous commitments to private
water users.

Private property rights were once justified principally

on the market theory that a rational profit maximizer who owns
natural resources will utilize those resources in a manner that not
only optimizes his or her own interest but also society's overriding
interest in the efficient use of the resource, i^o

For example, farmers

167California Water Code § 1254 (West's Supplement 1995).
168James L. Huffman, “A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in
a Constitutional Dem ocracy,” Environm ental Law 19 (Spring 1989): 532.
Hereafter, Huffman, "A Fish Out of Water."
169Harrison C. Dunning, “The Significance of C alifornia’s Public Trust
Easement for California W ater Rights Law,” University of California. Davis Law
R eview 14 (Winter 1980): 397.
170Richard J. Lazarus, “Changing Conceptions o f Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust D octrine,”
Iowa Lqw Review 71 (1986): 650. Hereafter, Lazarus, "Changing Conceptions."
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irrigate crops so that they may grow food to sell for private gain.
The readily available food derived from the crop presumably
satisfies the public interest.

In this case, both public and private

benefits are derived from irrigation.

Today, however, the irrigation

water used may reduce stream flows for spawning salmon, deprive
thirsty cities of needed water, or deplete aquifers of farmers many
miles away.

Each public interest is inextricably tied to a private

interest and vice versa.

Thus, involuntary reallocation gives some

Californians free access to water resources for their "public" uses to
which they historically have not had access.

In so doing, they are

applying their own definitions of beneficial use.

Some people will

have no difficulty in refusing to protect agricultural expectations and
interests, but others will disagree.

Violating expectations through

judicial interpretation will nullify a substantial portion of California's
written water law.
Com m ons
The Public Trust Doctrine does not establish the public’s
obligation to public-trust resources.

Garret Hardin’s, "The Tragedy of

the Commons," predicted the eventual overexploitation of all
resources used in common by the public and that “freedom in
commons brings tragedy to all.”^7i

Later versions countered his

claims, arguing that, when resources degrade or diminish, local
communities organize to control commons access and articulate a set

171 Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968):
1243-1248.
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of

ru le s.

172

California’s water resources cannot be governed in a

localized manner because water moves between phases of the
hydrologie cycle and between geographical locations, preventing it
from being an isolated local resource.

Thus, water resources are

particularly vulnerable to degradation simply because the ill effects
are rarely linked to a particular place or practice.

The wider the

variety of public-trust uses in the resource, the less chance of
identifying the degrading culprit and, thus, the less chance of
enacting good legislation. 173

Common access to water resources

poses a substantial threat.
Historically, secondary extractive uses were secured as
legitimate public interests under the Roman, English, and American
Public Trust Doctrines. 174

Yet, this illusory security ignored the

complexity of ecosystem function and the resulting chain-reaction of
resource depletion.

For example, it is rarely disputed that in the

eighteenth century exploitative fishing in "common" English waters
resulted in massive resource depletion, creating an expanded interest
in the bountiful cod populations of the New World. 175

The English

Public Trust Doctrine protected and encouraged private consumptive
uses in common public resources which directly occasioned their
demise.

Clearly, although the social intentions were noble, the

172David Feeny, et. al., “The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-two Years
Later,” Human Ecology 18 (1990): 13.
173Non-point source pollution is one example o f this problem.
NonPoint sources are those sources of pollution that cannot be identified at a
specific point. Instead, they can be generalized to a particular area. Often, the
pollution is a cumulative effect from many small sources.
174girks, Mcleod, and Krueger, J u s tin ia n is . supra note 133.
175Gillian T. Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660
(Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1969): 3f, 23f, 26, lOOf.
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doctrine's historical scope was rooted in misperceptions about the
bio physical environment, both in terms of hydrological principles
and ecosystem function.

Unfortunately, these oversights were

instrumental in the creation of California's Public Trust Doctrine.
The Spanish experienced many similar problems in their
common water resources in California.

Multiple-use common waters

were used to clean laundry, remove waste, irrigate crops, and engage
in recreation.

Oftentimes, careless individuals would degrade

drinking water by bathing in, building cesspools near, or allowing
their cattle near the main ditch.

The result was a polluted water

supply which the centralized local officials could not prevent, even
though they levied fines and

s a n c t io n s .! 76

Therefore, in order to preserve water resources through the
Public Trust Doctrine, the public must undertake a strict obligation
not to harm the water resource.

Trampling spawning grounds in the

public interest of recreation, eroding stream beds in the interest of
anchoring, and polluting water bodies with human waste and refuse
will harm the common resource.

Many persons would absolve

themselves from such an accusation, but upon close scrutiny, water
degradation may be an unconscious

a c t . ! 77

The Public Trust Doctrine

represents noble ideology but it relies on archaic perceptions of
homogenous societies with shared beliefs as to how water should be
manipulated and used.

!76M eyer, W ater in the HispanLC_Southwest. supra note 43.
!7 7 Alvin J. Greenberg, "The Quality of Water," in C a lifo rn ia 's
Threatened Environm ent. Restoring the Dream, ed. Tim Palmer (W ashington,
D C.: Island Press, 1993), 94-108.
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The primary goal of the Public Trust Doctrine is to equitably
reallocate water to its most beneficial use.

Although the goal is

justified, the doctrine fails to confront the problems of diverging
public interests, satisfying private expectations, and sharing common
waters.

Some say that if taken to an extreme, the Public Trust

Doctrine could wholly undermine state water law by making all
permits and licenses tenuous. ^78

Others say that the Public Trust

Doctrine is vitally important because it provides a means of control
over precious natural resources threatened with irreparable harm
not anticipated in an earlier time when development was the prime
consideration. 179
California's government derives its authority from the
agreement of free individuals.

But the Public Trust Doctrine is rooted

in the type of common-law assumptions, such as the ancient
reservation of a trust interest, that modern administrative law was
designed to displace through written law.

It fuels a developing clash

in liberal ideology between furthering individual rights of security
and dignity, tied to private-property protection, and intrusive
governmental programs designed to achieve longer-term collectivist
goals by supporting environmental protection and resourcepreservation.

Its flexibility comes at the expense of individual

security that is so important to resource stability.^ so

Finally, it

undermines the fact that the best form of government is democracy.

178Huffman, "A Fish Out of Water," supra note 167, 5 6 4 - 6 5 .
179Michael C. Blumm, "Public Property and the Democratization of
Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine."
E n v i r o n m e n t a l Law 19 (Spring 1989):
573.
ISOLazarus, "Changing Conceptions," supra note 170, 631.
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Good representative democratic systems make as few decisions as
possible through the government.

If public resource allocations are

perceived to be a problem, we should look at the possibility of
improving the private-rights system before resorting to an arcane
doctrine that probably never meant what its proponents claim it
means and that ignores the fact that the foundation of our resource
allocation system is private property rights.^^i

181 Huffman, "Trusting the Public Interest," supra note 128, 565.
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CHAPTER 6
WATER MARKETING
As mentioned above, a water transfer requires a change in
either the point of diversion, place of use, or type of use historically
associated with a water right.

The transfer remains intact as long as

it does not adversely affect other water-right holders on the body of
water.

Similarly, relying upon these same restrictions, water

marketing encourages the voluntary transfer of established water
rights through market mechanisms.

In fact, many California water

planners wish to establish a market system free and responsive
enough to allow the water-deficient parts of the state to obtain water
upon short notice from areas with a surplus

s u p p l y . 182

The idea

gained popularity during the prolonged drought between 1987 and
1992.

In 1991, after four drought years and three winter months of

meager precipitation, California’s water supplies had plummeted to
critical levels.

Storage in major reservoirs was below fifty percent,

the lowest level in California’s history, and many counties had
declared drought

e m e r g e n c i e s . 183

With no end in sight, Governor

Wilson signed Executive Order No. W-3-91 which commissioned the

182Departm enl o f W ater Resources, "Water Transfers in California:
Translating Concept into Reality," (November 1993): 7, 9.
183Department of Water Resources, "The 1991 Drought W ater Bank,"
(January 1992): 1.
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development of a “drought water

b a n k . 84

The bank established a

market system which allowed willing sellers to sell water to the
"bank" which in turn sold the water to entities with critical needs.
The success of the water bank in saving the state from a potential
disaster revived interest in water reallocation through a market
system.

By 1992, Governor Wilson had directed every government

agency to encourage water marketing as a Level 1 response to
increased urban and environmental demands.

Level 1 responses are

those that have “undergone extensive investigation and
environmental analyses and are judged to have a higher likelihood of
being implemented." 185
The goal of water marketing is to allow water users,
particularly farmers, to redistribute water resources to higher value
uses through a market system.

These higher valued uses include

urban consumption, in-stream flows, and high-valued crop
production.

For example, water conserved through efficient water-

management techniques could be traded or resold to other water
users for reclaimed water or money.

As long as each participant

derived benefits from buying and selling the water, the market could
be maintained.

Increased conservation, resulting from an enlarged

demand and growing economic profits, could lead to more
competition among water suppliers and thus, more water available
for redistribution.

Although the market has theoretical cohesion.

^84Lioyd S. Dixon, Nancy Y. Moore, and Susan W. Schechter,
"C alifornia's Drought W ater Bank, Economic Impacts in the Selling Regions,’
RAND Corporation, 1993, 1-3.
185Hart, California Water Plan Update. Vol. I, supra note 10, 12.
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unfortunately, real-world transactions have impacts beyond the
scope of the traditional market.
Water markets can be studied by their effects on two
subtopics:

efficiency and

d is t r ib u t io n . 186

Efficiency questions relate

to the amount of the resource available, while distributional
questions address proportional sharing.

For instance, in California, a

certain amount of water could produce goods and services more
highly valued in the market place if it were shifted from agricultural
to industrial uses; this is an efficiency argument.

On the other hand,

this shift may damage the interests of a farmer’s customers,
employees, or suppliers while helping industrial interests; all
distributional considerations.

Is it possible to divide water resources

in such a way that everybody profits from its use?

Certainly not.

In

fact, any particular change in the direction of efficiency will involve a
certain intrinsic change in the dispersal of gains and losses among
distributional parties.

In practice, it may be unfeasible and

impractical to effect a redistribution of water such that everyone
g a in s.187

Nevertheless, just as with the Public Trust Doctrine, the

goal of water marketing is to maximize gains to as many people as
possible.

The principal concern however, is the extent to which the

owner of a water right may change the place or purpose of water use
with respect to its historical use, possibly inflicting injury upon "third
parties."1^^

Despite these fears, many economically oriented policy

186xhom as Tietenberg, Environm ental and Natural Resource E conom ics.
3d. ed., (New York: HarberCollins Publishers, Inc., 1992): 18-69. Hereafter,
Tietenberg, E nvironm ental Econom ics.
187Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and
E r n n n m i c s 2 4 (October 1960):
110.
188Gould, "Transfer of W ater Rights," supra note 106, 457.
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analysts and influential segments of the national environmental
community enthusiastically endorse water marketing because it
could simultaneously pacify many competing public and private
water interests.
M a r k e ts
Economic theory asserts one almost universal principle which
characterizes an efficient allocation—the principle of equimarginal
value.

The value of any unit of water purchased by a person is

essentially measured by the maximum quantity of resources which
the consumer would be willing to trade for that unit.

Marginal valu e

is the value of the last unit acquired which normally declines as the
quantity of water acquired increases.

The principle, then is that

water should be so allocated that all persons derive equal value from
the marginal (last) unit acquired.

When this unit of water is valued

equally by each party based upon the benefit that they can derive
from it, then there are no more mutually advantageous trades and
efficiency has been attained.

Any person who found himself with so

much water that the marginal value to him was less than market
price would be trying to sell water, while anyone with a marginal
value greater than market price would be seeking to buy.

It is best

summarized in the basic economic theory of supply and demand.
Tietenberg has outlined the essential components for a perfect
water market:
1.

Property rights must be well-defined
a.
O wnership
b.
Specification of rights
c.
T ransferability
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2.
3.
4.

The market must have many buyers and sellers
Resources must be mobile
The participants must have good information system s!89

Obviously, the perfect market has its limitations.

Buying and selling

water will only be perfectly efficient if no third-parties are affected
by the transaction, which will, of course, never be the case.

To

permit the operation of the market in apparent total disregard for
the special needs and requirements of various interests in an area
which arouses such intense anxiety as does water, particularly in
California, is u n w i s e . T h u s , when a market must accommodate
outside interests and other variables, it becomes imperfect,
sometimes leading to total market failure.
When a market becomes imperfect, at least one of the following
conditions is present:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

External social groups influence market activities
Joint consumption of the resource exists where outsiders
benefit (at no expense) from the transaction
Imperfect competition occurs because either there are not
enough buyers or sellers, or individual buyers and/or sellers
can influence market prices
Market information is inaccurate
Acceptable risk varies among buyers and sellers
Public policies affect market processes!*!
Incomes are unevenly distributed!

!89Tielenberg, E nvironm ental E conom ics, supra note 186, 83-9.
!* 9 ^ rlh u r H. Chan, "To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of Interstate
Waters," M^^iiral Resources Journal 29 (1989): 547. Hereafter Chan "To Market
or Not to Market."
!91Saliba, W ater M arkets, supra note 103, 235-63.
192 Victor Brajer, et. al., "The Strengths and W eaknesses of W ater
Markets as They Affect W ater Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West,"
N a t u r a l PesQurces Joum al 29 (1989):
492.

8 1

•

Highly variable transaction costs

A perfect market exists only in theoretical models.

Outside interests

always have an interest in economic decisions made by governments,
corporations, or individuals.

But as imperfect as the market may be,

the ultimate goal is to give as many individuals and groups access to
the market so that they may further their particular interests and
goals as they see fit.
Resource shifts are common in our dynamic economy and are
the source of much of our economic and social growth.

As new

values arise, pressure increases to modify allocative processes in
order to recognize and accommodate new demands.

Reliance upon

market processes is consistent with the belief that individuals or
groups of individuals are the best judges of their own well-being and
have the right to make economic decisions in pursuit of their own
interests.

Since their are so many interests in water resources and a

readily available water supply, a water market is capable of
resupplying those interests that society and individuals deem
important.

Nevertheless, buyers and sellers will only participate in

water markets if they believe that they have something to gain,
whether the gain is characterized by spiritual or economic
prosperity.

Therefore, three conditions must be met for a water

transaction to take place between a buyer and a seller:
1.

2.

The buyer must expect returns from investment to be
more than the cost of the water and all costs associated
with the transfer
The seller must receive a price that equals or exceeds his
returns from actual use of the water
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3.

The buyer must view the transfer as the most
economically attractive method to acquire water 193

Although problems exist, water marketing can encourage water users
to conserve water in pursuit of individual self-interests while
simultaneously supplying water for other more beneficial public
uses.
Transferability of rights is the central requirement for
sustaining the efficiency of a market system.

Economic and social

transfer costs are associated with each aspect of a water transaction;
from the individual buyers and sellers, to the impacts on plants, fish,
and wildlife or other externalized third parties.

As transfer costs

increase, water prices increase, and the chances of reallocating a
water supply decrease.

Thus, reducing impediments to the free

transfer of water rights on both a permanent and temporary basis is
essential if water marketing is ever to become more than a
theoretical solution to water allocation

p r o b le m s.

194

T ypes
Although formalities differ among jurisdictions, the prevailing
rule in California is that most appropriative water rights may be sold
and/or transferred to different

la n d s .

195

The framework for these

transfers remains relatively static, giving transferees and transferors
some latitude in how they wish to carry out the physical transfers.
193saliba, W ater M arkets, supra note 103, 20-24.
194Robert Milliman, "Water Law and Private Decisionmaking: A
Critique," Journal o f Law and Economics 2 (1959): 41, 46. Transaction costs will
be explored later in detail.
195 Gould, George A. "Conversion of Agricultural W ater Rights to
Industrial Use," R acky^M ountain Mineral Law Institute 27B (1982): 1791, 1820.
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Water marketing can be expressed in many forms, including the
purchasing of permanent water rights, temporarily leasing water
through dry-year options, water banking, or many other innovative
arrangem ents.
P erm anent

W ater

Sales

Permanent sales of water are the most common type of
transfer in water markets,

In many instances, water-rights

holders sell their entire entitlements to other purchasers, while in
others, they sell only a portion of their entire water right.
Procedures and restrictions on the sale of senior water rights depend
on the nature of the rights and the jurisdiction in which they are
l o c a t e d . H o l d i n g a private water-right variously requires filing a
decree at the county courthouse; obtaining a license or permit issued
by a state agency; purchasing a “share” of a mutual water company’s
stock; sustaining a pattern of historical use without written record;
acquiring ownership of riparian land; or purchasing a water-delivery
contract with local, state, tribal, or federal water agency.

In many

cases, the rights held in “water jurisdictions” overlap, since water
movement rarely coincides with arbitrarily drawn political
boundaries.

Nevertheless, permanent water sales are embodied in a

l^^Saliba, W ater M arkets, supra note 103, 46-52.
197The state legislature has a general framework for the general rules
o f water m arketing but many sm aller entities have prohibitions on water
transfers.
For example, many areas such as Yuba county prohibit the free
transfer o f ground water out of their basin fearing that the water would
denude their surrounding ground water resources.
Other entities such as
irrigation districts in the Central Valley forbid the transfer o f surface- and
ground w ater siting possible declines in the economic stability o f their region.
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variety of methods that compensate for the differing types of water
ownership and the multitudinous jurisdictional problems.
The majority of California water transfers involve surface
water.

However, ground-water rights have accompanied the

purchase of many water ranches in areas where ground-water rights
are separately transferable.

One such market has existed for many

years in the Los Angeles area.

Beginning in the 1960s, a local court

established ground-water basins in the Los Angeles region and
assigned pumping rights to individual ground-water users.

Those

residents who hold such rights are still free to lease ground water
each season, or to sell their rights permanently.

In order to facilitate

transfers, the court established a state-sponsored clearinghouse for
the annual leasing of pumping rights.

The rights are leased at a set

price that reflects operating costs, local water assessments, and the
cost of imported water.

The success of the program has allowed for

several thousand acre-feet of ground water to be leased each year in
the Los Angeles

area.

1^8

Not all water purchases are made to fulfill the needs of cities,
developers, irrigators, and other end users.

Many individuals and

corporations have bought water rights simply because they believe
the value of water rights will escalate.

A typical investment

transaction involves the purchase of irrigation water rights and a
leasing back of the rights to the farmer for continued irrigation until
the investor is ready to resell the rights.

The lease-back provision

can be critical, not only in order to create annual benefits from the
l^S steven J. Shupe, Gary D. W eatherford, and Elizabeth Checchio,
"Wester W ater Rights: The Era of Reallocation," Natural Resources Journal 29
(Spring 1989): 416-27.
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water during the holding period, but also to continue the beneficial
use of surface rights to protect them from

fo r fe itu r e . 1^9

Another prominent type of permanent water-right purchase is
called “water ranching.”

Irrigators are often reluctant to sell water

rights independent of the land, because land without water is of little
economic value in many parts of California.

The factor has led to the

purchase of water ranches—lands conveyed solely for their
associated water rights.

Many economists argue that selling land and

water together solely for the water right needlessly consolidates
resources, and should not take

p la c e

.2 0 0

Others believe that this type

of permanent water purchase could drastically alter both the
economic and social infrastructure of rural towns in

C a lifo r n ia .2 0 1

Many Southern California water users who depend upon water
supplies from the Colorado River have explored the possibility of
buying property with water rights in other states and transporting
the water through the Colorado River Aqueduct or the All-American
Canal into the urban areas of the

state

.202

Some water officials argue

that it is unlawful to undertake interstate water ranching or water
marketing while others maintain that to prevent interstate transfers
and marketing perpetuates antiquated water-use patterns that run
contrary to efficient water utilization and modern demands.

The

United States Supreme Court ruled, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, that
199The Doctrine o f Prior Appropriation requires that all water diverted
from a stream be used beneficially or the right will be lost. The principle has
been coined the “use it or lose it” provision.
200xietenberg, E nvironm ental E conom ics, supra note 185, 60-7.
201 This argument is extremely important when addressing the issue of
fairness in water distribution and will be covered in detail in later sections of
this paper.
202Reisner, Cadillac D esert, supra note 30, 63, 81-2, 106, 125, 356-60.
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water is an article of commerce, and that states cannot unreasonably
restrict its interstate transport and

s a le .203

Whatever the case, an

increasing number of proposals for interstate water transfers will
require obtaining the cooperation and coordination of state officials,
which will no doubt prove to be a significant barrier to interstate
water ranching and

m a r k e tin g .2 0 4

Conversely, when a municipality or other user needs to
purchase water rights, it is not always necessary to buy the
appurtenant land.

Major transactions in water rights in several areas

have involved buying shares of agricultural water-districts stock
independent of the land.

This type of water transaction can take

place through a "standing purchase offer” in which the municipality
maintains an open invitation to buy excess water rights whenever
farmers want to sell them.

In any case, the majority of water-rights

transactions simply involve a single sale between a buyer and seller,
independent of standing offers, land purchases, or district shares.
Private developers typically use this type of transaction for their
subdivisions and commercial developments to satisfy ordinances that
require them to dedicate water to the town in which the subdivision
is to be

lo c a t e d .205

The developer will purchase a senior irrigation

right, retire it, and dedicate the water to the domestic use associated
with the development.
Another more common and more promising type of permanent
water purchase is called a “conservation offset.”

In this case, other

water users that need a more reliable water supply can make water
203Sporhase v. Nebraska 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254.
204(3ould, "Transfer of W ater Rights," supra note 106, 476.

205ibid.
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conservation investments in another users senior water right.

By

financing the modernization of old irrigation systems, junior users
may be able to make surplus water available for their use, while
letting the senior user continue to irrigate the same amount of land
with less water.

Although the legal questions involving such an

arrangement are complex, this strategy is being pursued in a number
of areas around California.
In Southern California for example, several conservation
strategies are being pursued to solidify municipal water supplies.

In

October 1988, the Bureau of Reclamation began a $5.2 million project
to line 1.5 miles of the Coachella Canal in extreme Southern
California.

The project tested an in-place lining technique that was

eventually used to seal large portions of the Coachella and AllAmerican canals.

Annual water savings resulting from the lining

project totaled 100,000 acre-feet per year.

The Metropolitan Water

District (MWD) was a major proponent of the project and paid a large
part of the bill in return for diverting a small portion of the salvaged
w a t e r .206

South of Coachella, the Imperial Irrigation District (HD) is

engaged in a water conservation plan with the MWD that will
eventually save 300,000 to 500,000 acre feet a year through canal
lining, tail-water recovery, and other improvements . 2 0 7

The

conservation offsets are positive responses to the water marketing
system .
An agreement to exchange one water supply for another
temporarily, seasonally, or permanently can prove advantageous to

206-Water Market Update 2 (October 1988):

207ibid.

3.
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parties with water rights that for some reason are not appropriate to
their respective needs.

For example, exchanges can be motivated by

water-quality differences when a municipality exchanges its surface
diversions for an irrigator's higher quality ground-water.

More

commonly, however, water exchanges are arranged in order to
accommodate delivery of water to the place of need.

For example,

federal water rights on the eastern side of the Central Valley can be
exchanged for federal rights in the Central Valley Project so that
more water users can be accommodated.
T em porary

W ater

Sales

The transfer of the right to use water need not be permanent.
In most jurisdictions, a water right may be leased for a season, a
year, or many years.

This temporary transfer can be an attractive

option for both the transferor and transferee because it maintains
continuity, preserves ownership by the holder of the right for future
use, and accommodates intermediate uses.

Parties to a water lease

are able to customize the arrangement to accommodate their specific
needs.

For instance, to increase flexibility, the lease can contain an

option for renewal or, to reduce future uncertainties, the rental rate
can be indexed over time to reflect cycles of the economy.

Short

term leasing arrangements are powerful tools to pacify variable
demands in geographical regions.
Between 1987 and 1992, Governor W ilson’s administration
investigated several creative measures in an effort to ameliorate
California’s prolonged drought.

As noted earlier, the Governor

created the "Drought Water Bank" in 1991 which, through free-
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market purchases, redistributed “surplus” water throughout
California through the state and federal water projects.208 The
administrators of the water bank purchased water at $125.oo an
acre-foot from those farmers willing to sell, and then resold the
water at $175.®^ an acre-foot to cities for urban consumption, to
environmentalists to maintain in-stream flows, and to farmers
producing high-value crops.
proved disappointing.

Initially, the state’s market system

Some farmers were denied permission to sell

water by local irrigation districts while others feared that by selling
their water, they might jeopardize the future of their water rights.
Still others believed that they could force the state to double or triple
its price.209

When heavy rains fell in March 1991, demands for

emergency supplies were reduced, but many farmers, hoping not to
lose the new option, changed their minds and allowed the state to
purchase some 835,000 acre-feet.2io

Though short of the state’s goal

of a million acre-feet, this was still an impressive figure—more than
the amount that Los Angeles uses in a normal year.

Heavy March

rains, however, created the problem of finding enough customers for
all this “surplus” water.

Nonetheless, Governor Wilson was so

impressed by the amount of reallocated water that he re-established
the water bank in 1992, which eventually led to its establishment on
a permanent basis.2H

The successes of the water bank prompted

208The Drought W ater Bank was a reallocation system originally
designed as a drought mitigation method.
It has expanded interest in water
tran sfers through m arket m echanism s.
209pepartm ent of W ater Resources, "The 1991 Drought W ater Bank,"
(January 1992).
210lbid., 2.
211 George Skelton and Jennifer W arren, “Urban Areas To Get More
W ater,”
Los Angeles Tim es. 6 April 1991, A14. See also Virginia Ellis,
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several new sections of water transfer law related to water
marketing in the California Water

C o d e

.212

Another type of dry-year transfer is the dry-year option.
When water users normally have a reliable supply but are subject to
unacceptable shortfalls in dry years, they can acquire an option to
lease water from another party during those dry years.

Dry-year

options have been negotiated between some cities and farmers in
C a l i f o r n i a . I n 1987, the MWD of Southern California initiated
negotiations on a dry-year option with farmers in the Palo Verde
Irrigation District for the right to use up to 100,000 acre-feet of their
water during future dry years.

The MWD offered the irrigators

$200.00 for each acre they placed in the option program and a
minimum of an additional $400. 0 0 per acre each year that the MWD
exercises its option and diverts the water to Southern California
m u n ic ip a lit ie s .2

14

The arrangement is set to last forty years, with

the irrigators continuing to farm, except during those years in which
the MWD exercises its option.2i5
In Northern California, the East Bay Municipal Utilities District
(EBMUD) is assessing a dry-year option as one strategy to augment
municipal water supplies.

In July, 1988, EBMUD offered to enter into

a long-term arrangement with local irrigators for a dry-year option.
In those years deemed "critically dry" by the state's index, EBMUD

“Panel OK’s Bill Easing Limits on Water Sales,” The Los Angeles Tim es. 5 June
1991, A3, A19.
212Sections 109, 475, 1706, 1725-1746 of the California Water Code
213California Water Code §§ 1725 to 1730 (West Supplement 1995).
214$. J Shupe and J. A. Folk-Williams, eds.. W ater, M arket Update 1 (June
1987): 8. Hereafter, Shupe, W ater M arket.
215$hupe, W ater Market. February, 1988, 2.

9 1

would purchase the irrigators’ water for about $50.^0 per acre-foot.
The proposal proved controversial and was rejected by area water
users who considered the purchasing price too low.

Despite this

setback, EBMUD is still exploring a dry-year option as one way to
meet future water-supply needs . ^ 1 6
Subordination agreements achieve a purpose similar to that of
dry-year option arrangements.

They are based upon the fact that a

major attribute of an appropriative water right is its relative
priority, which can be marketed separately from the right itself.

For

instance, the subordination agreement could be useful for a city with
a junior water right (for example, the fourth priority on a stream
system) that needs to build a new water treatment plant, but cannot
obtain financing because its water right is not judged reliable
enough.

If the city could purchase agreements from the holders of

the three senior priorities, under which those holders would allow
their rights to become subordinate in dry years, a more reliable
water right could be created without any form of a transfer.

A

senior priority may be compromised for something other than
money.

It can be given up for storage rights or other benefits in a

new water project.
Sharing

W ater

R ights

Other mechanisms to buy or lease water rights can include
multiple parties, called "allocation with complementary uses."

For

instance, in California, maintaining in-stream flows could benefit a
variety of public interests, such as hydroelectric production and
216ghupe, W ater

M arker.

September, 1988, 2.
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environmental conservation.

If a farmer wanted $150.^0 per acre-

foot for his water right and the utility company only wanted to pay
$50.00 per acre-foot, the sale would not take place.

If, however, the

State of California was willing to pay an additional $50 .0 0 per acrefoot and a private environmental group was willing to pay $50.oo per
acre-foot, then the transaction could take place.

In such a situation,

the groups could join assets and purchase the water rights at a price
that would satisfy not only the hydroelectric and environmental
uses, but the agronomist as well.^i?

Creative approaches to long

term or short-term water transfers through water markets could
reallocate water efficiently, potentially benefiting a variety of public
and private interests.
W ater

P ricin g

Water pricing is another efficiency

co n cern .2 1 8

jn order to

initiate water transfers through the market system, the prices for
water must be below the marginal price for the buyers and above
the marginal price of the sellers.

Prices for agricultural water are far

below the prices that most urban and environmental users are
accustomed to paying.

For example, in 1990, growers paid between

$2.50 and $19.31 an acre-foot for untreated water from the federal
Central Valley Project and between $22.^0 and $47.<^^ an acre-foot for
untreated water from the State Water Project.

The Metropolitan

Water District of Southern California, on the other hand, paid $2 3 3 .^ 0

217Hirshleifer, et. al.. W ater Supply, supra note 120, 36-42.
218Tietenberg, E nvironm ental E conom ics, supra note 185, 234-35.
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for an untreated acre-foot of state

w a te r .2 i9

Furthermore, the

cheaper agricultural water is distributed to farmers growing low 
valued crops, such as rice and cotton, declared to be in surplus and
yet also eligible for additional subsidies from the federal
government's

price-support

p r o g r a m

. 22 0

The result is that the four

California crops consuming the most water (rice, alfalfa, cotton, and
irrigated pasture) produce little or no return.

Even more disturbing

is the fact that rice loses more water to evaporation than Los Angeles
uses each

y ea r

.221

Clearly, water is not used efficiently.

Farmers are

willing to sell their water to turn a profit, while buyers need the
water to pacify growing urban and environmental demands.

Such

deficiencies in allocation could be pacified through a free water
market.

Economic self-interest could cause the elimination of waste

resulting in reallocations to more beneficial uses of water.
Water prices are determined by a variety of characteristics,
such as reliability and flexibility in purpose and place of

u s e . 222

The

price of a water rights is positively related to quality, priority date,
geographical flexibility, and administrative transaction costs.

The

price is expected to be negatively related to the size of the
transaction:
d e c r e a s e s .

as the water acquisitions increase, the price per unit
223

in a perfect water market, water prices would be

determined only by water quality, priority date, the amount of the
219Dcpartment o f W ater Resources o f the State of California, “The 1991
Drought W ater Bank," (January 1992): 5.
220pisani, Fam ily Farm, supra note 113, 440-50.
221 Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35, 385
222fionnie G. Colby, et al., “Water Right Transactions: Market Values and
Price D ispersion,” W ater Resources Research 29 (June 1993), 1565. Hereafter,
Colby, et. al., "Water Right Transactions."
2 2 3 ib id .
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transfer, and the transfer distance.

Unfortunately, the real economic

cost of transferring water must include administrative fees, legal
fees, local taxes, state taxes, and other unexpected natural and social
costs.

If the extra costs of implementing a voluntary water transfer

become too high, then many beneficial transfers will not take place
and water supplies will remain locked into suboptimal patterns of
u s e .224

Since regional economic changes have increased the demand
for water in non-irrigation uses, and basin water supplies remain
fixed, the real value of water rights increases over

tim e .225

Similarly, the priority date, or date that the water right was
acquired, gains worth as demands for water grow.

Prices paid for

senior water rights that can be exercised throughout the summer
peak demand period are three times higher than prices paid for
junior water rights limited to diverting water during periods of high
stream flows.

On average, senior irrigation water rights fetch prices

up to thirty percent higher per acre-foot than similar junior water
rights, as long as the other factors remain

co n sta n t.2 2 6

Another pricing factor, geographical flexibility, refers to the
geographical area within which a right can be moved to a buyer’s
new place and purpose of use.

These conveyance costs dampen the

amount buyers are willing to pay for water rights, because the longer
the distance that the water has to travel, the more water will be lost
to natural processes, such as seepage and evaporation.

Thus, the

224colby, McGinnis, and R ait "M itigating Environm ental Externalities,"
supra note 102, 770.
225Colby, et al., "Water Right Transactions," supra note 222, 1570.
226ibid., 1569.
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further a buyer moves water, the higher the actual costs of that
water will be.

Other locational factors also affect the water price.

For example, water transferred to Los Angeles from the Colorado
Plateau may be higher in dissolved minerals than is water
transferred from the upper reaches of the Sacramento River.

The

degraded quality of the Colorado River water affects its value for
certain uses.

Hence, the geographical location of the original water

resource w ill affect water pricing whether through distance
transferred or projected quality upon arrival.
The final, but most important, factors in water pricing are
transaction

c o s t s . 227

These expenses are simply the costs associated

with making the market system function.

In California water

markets, parties incur transaction costs in defining property rights
unambiguously enough so that sales can take place, generating
information about available water, searching for trading partners,
ascertaining the characteristics o f water rights, negotiating terms of
exchange and contract provisions, enforcing both property rights and
contracts for both the buyer and the seller, and obtaining legal
approval for the proposed change in water

u s e . 22

8

Transfer

applicants and objectors incur other costs in this latter category as
they seek to obtain state approval to transfer a water right to a new
place and purpose of use.

Costs incorporated into that study may

include attorney’s fees, engineering surveys, and hydrological
studies.

These fees can be substantial and adversely affect a water-

right transaction.
227colby, M cGinnis, and R ait "M itigating Environm ental Externalities,"
supra note 1 0 2 , 7 7 0 .
2 2 8 ibid.
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Another transaction cost is the cost, in both time and money, of
litigation.

Litigation to establish the legal standing of other public or

private interests is often initiated in order to force current waterright holders to account for third-party externalities.

For example, a

transfer of a water right outside of its original watershed may cause
damage to junior water rights holders or environmental systems
normally associated with the transferred water.

Under the constant

threat of legal action, state procedures to evaluate proposed water
transfers have become extremely complex and costly, since the
administrative processes must fully address environmental impacts
along with the traditional assessment of transfer impacts upon other
water-right

h o ld e r s .229

in fact, the transfers can become so

expensive, that the market system lapses into total

fa ilu re.2 3 0

Parties undertake market transactions for economic gain based
upon the perception that water supplies will generate higher returns
in their new use than in their former use.

The power to reduce this

expected gain by imposing transaction costs gives third parties
leverage with transfer proponents, forces transfer proponents to
internalize some external costs of transfers, and gives other outside
public and private values a role in the water-allocation process.231
Although these "third parties" have legitimate claims, a productive
water market in California could eliminate these internal costs.
229;yid

230In 1982, the California Legislature passed a series o f laws promoting
water transfers. In the four years that followed, not a single drop of water was
moved.
Some people suggest that the legal, environmental, and social
evaluation costs were so high that selling the water would have been too
expensive.
The result was that the legislation that encouraged water transfers
benefited no one.
231 Colby, M cGinnis, and Rait "M itigating Environm ental Externalities,"
supra note 102, 770.
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because the intrusive public interests would have the power to
satisfy their demands by buying their own water.

As a result of

these transaction costs, the market price does not accurately
represent the value of the water, and price no longer dictates the
beneficiallity of the water use.

For example, since water transfers

from the Owens Valley have been severely limited, and future
transfers from the Colorado River will be reduced. Southern
Californians are willing to pay at least six times the price per acrefoot that farmers are generally accustomed to paying for their
w ater.232

However, once legal and administrative fees are added, the

price of the water can increase to over ten times the value of the
actual water.

In a free water market, if environmental groups or the

California voters thought that the water would better serve
environmental interests, then they could purchase the water and
apply it to those interests.

Nevertheless, contemporary differences

in marginal pricing between potential buyers and sellers cannot be
overcome by market mechanisms, because the transaction costs
involved are much too high, which, in turn, prevent the efficient
allocation of water supplies.

232Abascal, Ralph Santiago and William G. Hoerger. California Rural
Legal Assistance.
Memo to board of supervisors regarding W ater Transfers and
Assembly bill 97. July 27, 1993
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CHAPTER 7
CONTROVERSIES IN REDISTRIBUTION
Water is a scarce resource that must be distributed among
diverse public and private interests.

Because water is essential to

sustain life and economic welfare, issues of fair distribution

a r is e .^ 3 3

The increase in water marketing, combined with the decrease in
developing new supplies, has introduced new issues and complexities
to California's water users and government officials.

On one hand,

state legislators must decide whether to take a passive role in
allowing water markets to operate under existing law and policy, or
to enact new laws either promoting or inhibiting water-rights
transfers.

On the other hand, water users must weigh the

desirability of selling water rights and the trade-offs between one
time economic gains versus long-term viability of regional
econom ies.
Since water is highly mobile (it flows, evapotranspires, and
seeps), it is difficult to define and measure property rights in water.
Supply can be highly variable across seasons, years, and locations,
and water quality varies as well.

This mobility combined with the

diversity of uses to which water can be put, create interdependencies
among water users, such as junior users dependent upon return
2 3 3 jarlo ck , Corbridge, and Gctches, W ater R e s o u r c e
note 85, 19.

M anagem ent, supra
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flow s and environmental concerns dependent upon in-stream uses.
Competitive markets have many desirable attributes, but the
interdependencies and public-goods characteristics associated with
water resources imply that a perfectly competitive market is not a
feasible water allocation process.^^4

jn fact, any redistribution of

water will produce a physical, biological, or social impact not directly
involved in the market transaction.

Thus, the external effects of

water marketing can be studied in terms of efficiency (the actual
market mechanism) and distribution (fairness in allocation).235
P h y sica l

Im p a cts

Throughout California, water marketing is perceived by many
as an effective way to promote water-use efficiency.

The state

legislature has been examining how efficiency in allocation can be
promoted by allowing farmers who modernize wasteful irrigation
systems to sell the water conserved.

In an effort to foster greater

cooperation among the state's numerous water districts and other
regulatory agencies, and also to discourage wasteful practices, the
legislature has authorized the transfer of water rights as long as
other users suffer no serious loss.236

Likewise, the state qualified

the "use it or lose it" principle of appropriation law by stipulating
that rights to water unused because of conservation would not be
lost.

In other words, if a person achieved the same (or better)

production goals using less water, by installing efficient irrigation or
234saliba, W ater M arkets, supra note 103,

24-6.
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transfer technology, the right to the saved water was not
d i m i n i s h e d . 237

Lawmakers have also encouraged conservation

efforts by granting rights to reclaimed waste water to the person
salvaging the

w a t e r .238

While impressive, these legislative advances

that encourage conservation and reallocation are inherently
d ecep tive.
The possibility of what might be achieved has been suggested
in recent negotiations between the MWD of Southern California and
the IID.

The HD, located in the South-Lahontan hydrological region,

has long transported water from the Colorado River, through the AllAmerican and Coachella canals, to irrigate crops in the desert regions
of the Imperial Valley.

The majority of the canals associated with

the irrigation district's delivery system were poorly constructed and
have historically been sources of substantial water waste.

As a

result, excessive seepage from the physical canals, leakage through
the canal gates, and substantial agricultural runoff is wasted—
eventually flowing into the Sal ton Sea, a land-locked body of water
in the South-Lahontan desert.

In past years, the amount of waste

water was so high that inflow into the lake exceeded evaporation,
causing the sea to rise and flood adjacent lands.

Since the water

levels were rising and shoreline properties were damaged, the IID
was under considerable legal pressure from the California

courts23 9

237California W ater Code §§ 1112 and 993 (1995 Supplement).
2 3 8 H u n d le y ,
The Great T hirst, supra note 35, 389.
239^gg Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 165 Cal.
App. 3d 952, 212 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1985); Elmore v. imperial Irrigation District, 159
Cal. app.3d 185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1984).
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and from the SWRCB240 to conserve water and reduce the flow of
"waste water" into the Salton

in 1984, the court ruled that

S e a .2 4 i

the district was wasting substantial quantities of water through
unreasonable use, and unless they divised a coherent conservation
plan, they would lose their rights to the waters diverted from the
Colorado River.

In 1988, the district presented a plan, but could not

produce the money to pay for it.

Eventually, the SWRCB and the

courts forced IID into an agreement with the MWD in which the
latter offered to finance the repairs to the canals as long as they
retained the rights to all of the conserved water.
The bargain was solidified in 1989, and the MWD lined the AllAmerican and Coachella canals and many other smaller irrigation
ditches while simultaneously recovering tail water from wasteful
irrigation practices.

The result of the conservation effort allows the

MWD to recover nearly 200,000 acre feet of water every year.

The

farmers have also gained from the transaction, since they did not
have to pay for the repairs and because they contracted to sell the
water to the MWD for thirty-five years at an annual cost of about
$128.®^ per acre-foot.242

This tremendous conservation project has

fulfilled the court order to repair the ditches and reclaim the wasted
water of the irrigators while simultaneously redirecting the water to
a more beneficial public use in Southern California.243
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The conservation effort has been so successful that agricultural
drainage and canal seepage that once flowed as ground water to the
Salton Sea, the state's largest inland body of water, has substantially
declined, causing the land locked sea to slowly shrink.

The sea’s

shrinkage coupled with the inevitable increase in the water’s salinity
has outraged a handful of Californians who use the water body for
recreational purposes.

Even though it is an artificial

c r e a tio n ,244

the

Salton Sea is viewed by many recreationalists as a valuable public
resource worthy of state

p r o te c tio n .2 4 5

Once again, the boundaries of

the Public Trust Doctrine are being tested in an effort to prevent the
transfer of the water so that recreational interests can be protected.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that ditch seepage and other return
flows can rarely be salvaged without adversely affecting other water
users.

As a result, many localized jurisdictions have created laws

that flatly prohibit senior users from changing their water right in a
way that would injure other water users in the basin, even if the
basin is

a r tific ia l.246

Other jurisdictions inhibit water conservation

by allowing a transfer of irrigation rights only to the extent of
historical crop

c o n s u m p t io n .247

Consequently, if there are

irresponsible.
They consider any transfer o f water south to be in effect
“feeding the fire" and encouraging more irresponsible developm ent.
244The sea was once one of many end points for the “natural” Colorado
River.
However, with the construction of dams and the channelization o f the
river towards the G ulf of California, the river no longer empties into the
Salton Sea. The Sea was artificially filled in 1905 when the Colorado River tore
through a faulty diversion canal and flooding the ancient sea.
The diversions
through the All-Am erican Canal have helped m aintain the se a's current
le v e ls .
245Bill Karr, “The Environment Needs W ater,” The Los Angeles Tim es. 26
October 1989, B6.
2 4 6 C a l i f o m i a W a t e r C o d e §§ 10505 a n d
10505.5 ( W e s t ' s S u p p l e m e n t 1995).
247california Water Code § 10900 (West's Supplement 1995).
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irretrievable losses (for example through evaporation, weed
transpiration, or irretrievable percolation), the irrigator is not
entitled to salvage and market this portion of the water right.
Therefore, improvements in irrigation efficiency that simply reduce
return flows may not enable the investor to capture and sell the
conserved water if those return flows had historically been used by
others.
Current law regarding the marketing of salvaged water is
extremely complex.

In earlier times, lawmakers and judges were

confronted with a much simpler situation, and were able to state
with some certainty that the person who installs water saving
devices is allowed to take the water thus saved. Such a statement
was generally made after citing several old cases in which irrigators
who installed pipes and lined ditches were given the right to utilize
the former seepage
different.

lo s s e s .248

Today, however, the process is

The example of the HD s conservation contract with the

MWD illustrates the greatest distributional problem associated with
water marketing:

protecting third-party interests.

Californians have

very different ideas about how water should be used.

Hence,

protecting all of those interests through legislative action may be
impossible.

In an effort to assure adequate protection to third-

parties, the legislature requires a series of extraordinarily difficult
and expensive administrative steps to be taken before an out-of
basin water transfer can be made.

248Richard W. Dickenson, "Installation o f W ater Saving Devices as a
Means of Enlarging and Appropriative Right to Use o f Water," N a tu ra l
R ftsn iirces

L a w 1 (1 9 6 9 ):

272, 285.
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If a farmer in a federally supplied irrigation district wants to
permanently transfer his conserved water to an environmental
group for in-stream flow in the Sacramento River for endangered
Chinook salmon, he must undertake a series of administrative steps
before one drop of water can be transferred.
written approval from the following agencies:

First, he must obtain
the United States

Bureau of Reclamation, the Secretary of the Interior, any third party
whose conveyance facilities are used, the Department of Fish and
Game, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Board of
Supervisors from his irrigation

d is tr ic t,249

possibly the Board of

Supervisors from his county, the State Water Resources Control
Board, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of Water Resources.

Second,

he must comply with the stipulations of the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA), which include completing an environmentalimpact report, and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA),
which include compiling an environmental-impact

sta te m e n t.2 5 0

2 4 9 ^ predom inant obstacle to water marketing and transfers is found in
the scores of local water districts scattered throughout the state, especially
those in agricultural areas.
These districts tend to have rules prohibiting the
transfer o f water beyond their boundaries.
It is their assumption that keeping
all o f the water in their district will assure the continued viability o f their
local economies.
So far, working through the powerful Association of
California W ater Agencies, they have successfully resisted even those state
legislative attem pts to offer local econom ic and environm ental protections in
exchange for allowing individuals with more water than
they need to sell to
customers outside a district. The attitude of the districts is summarized by this
statement o f a Central Valley farmer as cited in The Los Angeles Times in June
of 1991: "Without a right to veto any such sale, nothing doing." Jennifer
Warren and Virginia Ellis, “S tate's Water Bank Doing Fine — Except for
Buyers.” A l, A l l .
250£dward J. Tiedemann, ESQ., “W ater Transfers in 1993: Relationships
between Federal, State, Local, and Individual W ater Systems,” taken from CLE
International conference on California W ater Law, March 18-19, 1993 in San
Francisco, California, 4, 6, and 7
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Third, he must pay the extra taxes levied against his transaction,
such as the $25

per acre-foot tax that he must give to the federal

government and the $10.®^^ per acre-foot tax that he must give to his
irrigation

d i s t r i c t . ^51

Even then, he is not in the clear.

The possible

threat of a lawsuit from a downstream water user or a public trust
interest may discourage him from redistributing the water even if he
completes all of the fieldwork and paperwork.
investigative costs may also become substantial.

Legal fees and other
Thus, the costs in

terms of money and time involved in completing the transaction
prohibit permanent water transfers from being worthwhile
endeavours for many persons with excess
exemplified in 1986.

This fact was

s u p p lie s .^52

Six years after the California Legislature

enacted laws intended to move water allocation toward a free
market, not a single drop of water was traded in the

s ta te .2 5 3

The

demand was there, but the transaction costs were simply too high.
The idea behind water markets is to encourage low-value
water users to sell their water to higher-valued uses.

In order to

clarify the law and promote water use efficiency, the California
Legislature has enacted a bill which sanctions the marketing and use
of salvaged irrigation

w a te r .2 5 4

Theoretically, by selling excess

water, farmers will have financial motivation to monitor irrigation

251 Ibid. See also The Central Valley Project Improvement Act. Title
XXXIV of Public Law 102-575 (1992).
25 2Tbere is, however, one exception. In sections 1725-1732 of the
California W ater Code, a te m p o r a r y change of transfer of one year or less is
exempt from almost all state regulations.
See Hart,C alifornia W ater
Plan
U p d a te . Vol. I, supra note 10, 39.
253Glenn F. Bunting, “Bid To Alter State’sW ater Allocation Loses,” T h e
T n g A n g e l e s Tim es. 22 May 1985, A3, A28.
254california Water Code § 1011 (West Supplement 1995).
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applications, observe each crops consumptive water use, and
redesign overall farm management practices.

Water markets might

also encourage farmers to use less water-intensive crops and more
efficient irrigation equipment and techniques.

If water markets

encourage better farm and water management practices, then
perhaps these are grounds for breaking down transaction barriers
and strongly encouraging market implementation.

If water is

conserved then the once "wasted" water can be reclaimed and then
reallocated to other uses.

Even though improvements to irrigation

techniques and transfer processes could conserve enough water to
satisfy all of the growing urban, environmental, and industrial
demands well into the next century, there are many impediments to
the free transfer of water rights which, in turn, diminish the
incentives to conserve water in the first place.

For instance, properly

used drip irrigation systems will inherently diminish applied
irrigation water, which will reduce runoff, which may reduce return
flows, which may injure third-parties.

Moreover, even if a farmer

wanted to conserve water for personal reasons, purchasing the
sophisticated technological equipment is often beyond his or her
financial means.

Therefore, Californians must explicitly define their

goals for water resources in order to maintain long-term water
resource stability.

107

No-Injury and Area o f Origin Rules
The guiding principle for preventing third-party impacts in
water transfers is the “No Injury

R u le .

”255

The rule states that the

transfer must...
not injure any legal user o f the water...through resulting
significant changes in water quantity, water quality, timing o f
diversion or use, consumptive use o f the water, reduction in
return flows or reduction in the availability o f water within the
w atershed o f the t r a n s f e r o r . 2 5 6

An interesting ramification of the appropriation system is that water
rights are based solely upon the amount of water in a stream.
“Return flow ” from applied irrigation water, in many cases,
constitutes a substantial part of in-stream

flo w .

257

in

fact, many

water appropriations depend specifically upon the reliability of this
return flow.

Therefore, many downstream interests fear that

salvaging historically wasted irrigation water upstream would
ultimately affect their water

r ig h ts.

258

The assumption here is that

water that is applied to a farm during irrigation returns to the
watershed as surface water.

Could the water instead be percolating

deep into aquifers, or staying attached to soil particles, or moving out
of the basin as ground water flow?

Assuming that applied irrigation

255California Water Code §§§ 1725, 1736, and 1792 (West Supplement
1995). Also see McDonald v. Bear River and Auburn Water and Mining
Company, 13 Cal. 220 (1896).
256California W ater Code § 1725 (W est's Supplement 1995).
257sax, Abrams, and Thompson, L egal C ontrol, supra note 56, 138-42,
224-30, and 238-45.
258Steven J. Shupe, Gary D. W eatherford, and Elizabeth Checchio,
"Western W ater Rights: The Era of Reallocation," Natural Resources Journal.
29 (Spring 1989): 427-433.
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water migrates back into the stream channel above a junior user is in
many cases unfounded.

Hydrogeological studies for each individual

diversion would be required to make an accurate determination.
Every drop of water in a water system serves some function.
When water is extracted from a natural system, then that entire
system functions differently.

In the California Water Code, these

hydrological problems are recognized in the “area of origin”
sta tu te s.

9

These laws were initially intended to assure areas of

origin that any water needed for future economic growth and
development would become available.

However, today, the laws

require that environmental damage associated with water extraction
constitutes the extractor as liable.

Section 1245 of the Water Code

reads:
Every municipal corporation of this State, and every person, firm, or
corporation...w ho

enters

any w atershed...for the purpose

of acquiring

a water supply...shall be liable to all persons, firms and corporations,
their heirs, representatives and successors...for all dam age suffered or
sustained by them either directly or indirectly because of injury,
damage, destruction, or decrease in value o f any such
property...resulting from or caused by the taking of any such lands or
waters, or by the taking, diverting or transporting of water from such
w a te rsh e d .2 6 0

Any region that can prove that a water transfer caused any injury
can demand compensation.

If, for instance, the recreation industry

on the Upper Sacramento River could prove that the decreased
Chinook salmon runs are a product of a lack of water in quantity
2 5 9 C a lifo m ia
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and/or quality, and that the decrease in the salmon run is adversely
affecting the tourist industry, then transferred water may be subject
to recall.
system.

Any “taking” of water changes the dynamics of the stream
Thus, increasing water transfers could have substantial

unseen future impacts on both the economic and environmental
well-being of a region of “origin.”
Ground

W ater

Im pacts

Protecting third-party interests in ground water is another
external problem associated with water transfers.

During the

drought from 1987 to 1992, ground water overdraft became an
unfortunate side effect of reduced Central Valley Project and State
Water Project deliveries.

For example, in the San Joaquin River

hydrological region, ground water storage dropped by nearly five
million acre-feet while in the Tulare Lake hydrological region, the
water levels dropped by almost ten million a c r e - f e e t . I n the
environmental impact report (EIR) for the State Drought Water Bank,
the Department of Water Resources identified eleven overdrafted
ground water basins that would be adversely impacted by water
transfers out of these

r e g io n s .^62

However, they also claimed that

“transfers involving ground water substitution are e x p e c t e d to
originate in basins that are not overdrafted” (emphasis

a d d e d ).2 6 3

Non-voluntary water transfers are already occurring out of those
basins for environmental mitigation in the San Joaquin and
261 Hart, California W ater Plan U pdate. Vol. I, supra note 10, 107-10.
262Steve Macaulay, et. al., Department of W ater Resources of the State of
C alifornia, “Final Drought W ater Bank Environm ental Im pact R eport,”
(November 1993): 116-22.
263ibid., 116.

110
Sacramento Delta drainage.

Hence, if the farmers of the Central

Valley substitute ground water for transferred water rights, then
overdrafts will certainly expand.
Ground water overdrafts induced by trans-basin water
transfers will have other negative side effects as well.

Aggregated

aquifer depletion may stress or kill many plant and animal species of
the Central Valley.

When the aquifers are depleted, many drought

tolerant deep-rooted plant species, such as the Valley Oak, which are
dependent upon upward capillary movement of ground water
through the soil, will be deprived of vital water

s o u r c e s .264

As the

native species die, animals dependent upon those plants for food and
habitat may also perish.

The ecoregion as a whole suffers from

ground water overdraft, not just the agricultural community.

As

long as the current California ground-water policy remains, increased
water transfers could inadvertently create substantial environmental
degradation.
E n v ir o n m e n ta l

Im p a cts

Adverse environmental impacts caused by water transfers are
explicitly prohibited by the California Water

C o d e .265

Despite such

prohibitions, according to Peter Moyle, a fishery biologist at the
University of California at Davis, at the time Europeans first settled
in California, 116 species of native fish inhabited its lakes and
streams.

Since then, eight have become extinct, fourteen are

formally enlisted as endangered or threatened, twenty-eight qualify
264Ibid., 70-86.
Other species possibly further threatened are the BluntNosed Leopard Lizard, the California Kit Fox, and the Giant Garder Snake.
265California Water Code §§ 1725, 1736 (West Supplement 1995).
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for listing as endangered or threatened (table 4), and twenty-one are
declining or occurring in small isolated populations requiring
protective management.

In total, sixty-three percent of all native

fish are either permanently lost or require

p r o te c tio n .266

Likewise,

the declines in native plant species probably double or even triple
these figures.

Nevertheless, many of these extinctions are a direct

result of removing water from "origin" watersheds.
Water transfers through a market system could help enlarge
the populations of many species of endangered and threatened
animals.

For example, since many of the threatened fish species

require readily available supplies of fresh water, private
organizations or government agencies could purchase the water
necessary for transport to impacted regions.

The government could

even use its power of eminent domain if there were a watershortage
rewarded.

e m e r g e n c y .267

The goal here is that both sides are

Environmentalists gain access to water resources

necessary for species survival and farmers gain revenue by selling
the water.

The market can satisfy environmental demands.
Social

Im pacts

As agricultural water rights in California are slowly converted
to municipal, urban, and environmental uses, questions of fairness in

266Kevin M. O ’Brien, “Endangered Species Issues—A panel discussion,”
CLE International, San Francisco, March 18-19, 1993. Text of discussion from
the National H eritage Institute.
267Eminent Domain is a power awarded to the states by the United States
Constitution.
It can be used for a variety o f purposes, which specifically
include taking property with ju st com pensation for the protection statewide
w e ll- b e in g .
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Table 4.
Endangered and Threatened Species
Special Status
S o ecles

E con om ica lly
Im oortant Snecies

N a tive
S n ecies

C h in o o k

S triped B ass

W h ite

S tu rg e o n

P acific H errin g

G re e n

S tu rg e o n

A m e ric an

S ta rry

F lo u n d e r

S alm o n

D elta S m elt
S a c ra m e n to

S p litta il

L o n g fin S m elt

D u n g e n ess

S had
C rab

C rangon

f r a n c is c o r u m

C ra n g o n

n ig ric a u d a

T u le P erch
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redistribution are growing.

Section 386 of the California Water Code

states:
The [SWRCB] may approve any change associated with
a transfer...only if it finds that the change may be made
w ithout...unreasonably

affect[ing]

the overall

area from which the water is being

econom y o f the

tr a n s f e r r e d .^ ^

8

Since, nearly all water transfers originate in rural communities,
questions of fairness arise from the possibility that water transfers
may adversely impact communities which rely upon agriculture to
sustain their culture and economy.

Many experts assert that even

though rural-to-urban market transfers may appear econom ically
efficient, there are significant hidden costs and social impacts not
adequately reflected in market

tr a n s a c tio n s .269

For example, some

residents of rural counties are concerned over the possible erosion of
local tax bases when significant amounts of productive land are
taken out of irrigation or purchased for their water rights.

Others

are concerned that transferring water rights out of their counties
may impoverish their social well-being and destroy their cultural
heritage.

Furthermore, rural residents complain that in many cases

they have little or no authority in the decision-making process.

As

one farmworker said, “‘We have two ways to allocate things in the
United States.

We have money and we have votes.

the cities that have got it.”’270

In both cases it’s

The question, therefore, is:

Are

greater economic and social benefits for some communities more

268California Water Code § 386 (West Supplement 1995).
269saliba, W ater M arkets, supra note 103, 191-99.
270Lori Olsewski, “Running Dry—Why W ater Crisis W on’t End,” S an
f rpmriscn Chronicle. April 15, 1991. vol. 127, no 76, A l.
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desirable than sustaining and preserving the economy and cultural
identity of rural communities?
Third

Party

Im pacts

Large transfers of rights from rural to urban areas typically
arouse heated

d eb a te s.271

Permanent or temporary water transfers

out of rural communities may increase the incidence of fallowed
lands and, thereby, reduce agricultural productivity.

As a result, the

businesses that supplied the resources to produce the crops, the
workers that relied upon the jobs provided in the fields and offices,
and the community that relied upon the revenue generated by the
harvest and taxes, may all be reduced, thereby draining the
economic resources of the entire community.

A recent San Francisco

Chronicle article addressed the effect of idling a 500-acre cotton field
(one of the lower-value, least labor-intensive irrigated crops) and
determined that the reduction in the grower’s direct, in-community
expenditures for inputs, including seed, fertilizer, pesticides, on-farm
labor, fuel, equipment purchases and maintenance, and specialized
contractors, amounts to approximately $614.®^ per acre, or a total of
$307,080.®^ for the entire

fa r m .2 7 2

Some economists add a multiplier

of two to four times, which exacerbates the impact upon rural
communities even more.

Another three-year study of water

transfers, conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, concluded
that:

271 Dunning, "Dam Fights," supra note 114, 25.
272cited in Ralph Santiago Abascal and W illiam G. Hoerger, California
Rural Legal Assistance.
Memo to board o f supervisors regarding W ater
Transfers and Assembly Bill 97. July 27, 1993.
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...where production in irrigated agriculture is reduced because o f water
transfers, the farm ers that remain may be insufficient to support some
or all o f the local packing houses and seed, fertilizer, and machinery
distributors...the community becomes less prosperous.

The social

structure weakens at a time when a rural community may badly need
[it] to deal with economic change...Reduced job opportunities force
people to move...[and] the economic viability o f the community may be
th r e a te n e d .2 ^ ^

Unquestionably, reductions in crop production by local agronomists
will most likely adversely affect rural communities.
Water-right transfers that reduce crop production threaten not
only county tax bases, but also the overall economic health of rural
areas.

When productive agricultural acreage in an area is suddenly

reduced, severe secondary economic impacts can debilitate the
remaining farmers, as well as affect the businesses that supply and
depend upon agricultural customers.

State legislatures have been

looking at ways of addressing the economic problems associated with
transferring water out of rural regions.

Some legislators have argued

that in order to mitigate third-party repercussions, the state needs to
limit water transfers by ten, twenty, or even thirty percent of the
total amount annually consumed by a farmer’s

cro p .

274

However,

since neither the state nor the farmer can accurately measure how
much water his or her crop consumes, then the legal stipulation
would be

u n e n fo r c e a b le .

275

Moreover, this approach seems

273ibi(j,
274cortese in assembly bill 97, Katz in assembly bill 52, and Costa in
assembly bill 1605. Each bill had a stipulation taxing parties involved in water
transfers in order to pay for job retraining and social programs in “origin”
communities. All of the bills were defeated in the state assembly.
2 7 5 p e rh ap s
C a lif o r n ia ’s
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o f
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th e
is
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c o n tro v e rs ia l
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a s p e c ts
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th e re
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a re
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somewhat impractical, since the consumed water is the amount of
water that p r o d u c e s the crop, which, if decreased, would not benefit
the farmer or the rural community.

If the transfer process is going

the be effective then the focus of regulatory mechanisms should be
on the amount of water that is wasted by poor irrigation and
management techniques.

Still, enforcing legislative regulations on

farmers on this large scale would be impractical and with the current
minimization of the state's enforcement resources, probably
im possible.
The arguments that water transfers will destroy rural
economies are premised upon several assumptions.

For one, the

assumption that crop production will be reduced may be mistaken.
Since California law allows farmers to substitute ground water for
transferred surface water, one might conclude that with adequate
pumping, there would be no economic disruption to a small
community.

Ground-water substitution would allow the

crop

production to remain static and the community to remain intact.

On

the other hand, water transfers out of areas where ground water is
expensive to pump would probably reduce crop production, and
thereby, endanger the economic and social stability of the
community.

Therefore, considering that water transfers out of rural

many variables associated with m easuring water, deep percolation,
évapotranspiration, soil retention, g ro u n d w a te r flow, capillary action, and
surface w ater runoff, accurately m onitoring where the water goes after
an
application can only be generalized, but never perfectly measured over a
large area. Thus, major aspects of water law, such as determining waste, crop
consum ption, and return flows are extrem ely time consuming and almost
impossible.
Moreover, measuring the amount o f water transferred could pose
a problem , because, for example, the amount of water transferred from the
Sacramento River will surely be more than the amount o f water that will
actually reach Southern California.
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communities could produce economic collapse, each transfer must be
investigated on a case-by-case basis.
Even though ground-water substitution is legal, one of the
primary objectives of creating a water market is to encourage
farmers to conserve water through better management practices.
Efficient water management requires either installation and proper
utilization of more effective irrigation equipment or switching to
higher-valued, less water-intensive crops.

Therefore, theoretically,

encouraging farmers to sell conserved water rather than the entire
water right may, in fact, produce dual benefits to both the rural
community and the farmer by increasing yields for the community
and increasing revenue for the farmer.

Others disagree, stating that

changes in the type of crop or the methods of irrigation will reduce
agricultural employment opportunities because the workers in rural
communities are unable to adapt to changes in the agricultural
outputs.

Farmers who plant low-valued crops and wish to maintain

soil fertility are forced to rotate three different crops every three
y e a r s .

^76

Each of these crops require different irrigation and

harvesting techniques.

Likewise, third-parties associated with rural

agriculture, such as workers and suppliers, have been forced to
handle a variety of agricultural situations.

Therefore, assuming that

a change in the type of crop produced or the irrigation practice
utilized is going to put people out of work may be misleading.

The

type of work may change slightly, but workers will still be needed.

276This rotation allows the soil to add nitrogen and other plant
nutrients which would be far too expensive to apply, as chemical fertilizers, to
low -valued crops every year.
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Two studies by the University of California at Davis and the
RAND Corporation indicated that economic impacts of large, long
term or permanent water transfers upon rural communities were
generally within the range of normal economic fluctuations in the
Even though some sectors, such as farm employment,

r e g i o n . 277

were impacted more than others, both studies concluded that, while
impacts were not large on a county-wide or regional basis, the
incremental impacts were significant in an already depressed
economy.

However, if ground-water substitution for transferred

water becomes outlawed or large transfers of water necessary for
crop production become commonplace, then the economic and social
conditions of communities that rely upon agricultural production will
collapse as transfers increase.

Therefore, as large-scale water

transfers become more common, the economic impacts upon rural
communities will probably increase as well.
I n te r g e n e r a tio n a l

C on cern s

A second social impact that is often overlooked is the effects of
water transfers upon future generations.

Water is an intertemporal

resource that is necessary for human and ecological subsistence, both
now and in the future.
c o n su m e d 2 7 8

Deciding how much of the resource should be

now is, by the same token, deciding how much should

277Lioyd S. Dixon, Nancy Y. Moore, and Susan W. Schechter.
“California’s 1991 Drought Water Bank: Economic Impacts in the Selling
Regions,” Sacramento, California; RAND corp. 1993, 7-9. Holcomb, Valerie,
ed., “Buying and Selling W ater in California: Issues, Experience, and Policy
Options,” UCLA Extension Public Policy Program, November 12-13, 1992, 5.
278By consumed I mean that it is lost for an extended period to some use
that as of this era cannot be retrieved and reused in its pre-consumption state.
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be left untouched for future generations.279

Water markets affix

prices to water resources that reflect the current philosophies of
today’s generation, while future generations are denied any input
into the actions which might have fundamental impacts upon their
well-being.

Many natural-resource economists argue that if a price

is established that reflects the real cost to society of current
consumption, then the operation of resource policy can be left to the
market to decide.280

Since such foresight is impossible and the

market cannot represent the wishes of future generations, the state
retains the obligation to protect these interests.281 Protecting

the

future public interest is an important responsibility of the presiding
governm en t,282 especially since intergenerational conflict is moving
to the forefront of the water-transfer discussion.

With proper

implementation, the market system, combined with governmental
protectionism, can adequately assuage the water demands of current
and future generations.

279john A. Mclnerney, "Natural Resource Economics: The Basic
Analytical Principles in the Economics of Environmental and Natural
Resources Policy," edited by J. A. Butlin, Economics of Environm ental and
Natural Resources Policy 3rd ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc,
1981), 30-40.
280jgg Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches, W ater Resource M anagem ent,
supra note 85.
281 Victor Brajer, A1 Church, Ronald Cummings, and Phillip Farah, "The
Strengths and W eaknesses of W ater markets as They Affect W ater Scarcity and
Sovereignty Interests in the West," Natural Resources Journal 29 (1989): 493.
This obligation o f the state sounds like the protecting the public trust. I am
advocating that the trust be protected, but not by the means that the
legislature is not obligated to adhere to the law or its earlier decisions in
protecting that trust.
If the legislature fails to protect the public interest
through legal means, then it must rectify its mistakes in the same manner as
any citizen, by fixing them, not blaming others for the wrongdoing.
282(3aiifornia Water Code § 1255 (West Supplement 1995)
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Sum m ary
As the need for water to meet new demands intensifies,
pressure will increase to overrule cases and statutes which prohibit
voluntary water transfers.

It seems that even skeptics of market

solutions must concede that voluntary elimination of waste will occur
only where the volunteers receive the fruits of their labors.

Recent

California legislation expressly provides that conserved or reclaimed
water may be "sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise transferred."28 3
The purpose of these sections is to encourage efficient water
management and equitable distribution in the public sector by
encouraging those in the private sector to conserve or reclaim water
for personal benefit.

Even then, the California laws subject any

water transfer to the usual procedures and mandates, including the
obligation to not injure other appropriators,284 which w ill require
each transfer to be separately investigated and

e v a lu a te d .2 8 5

The fact is that the current situation of policies and laws does
not encourage farmers to conserve water, so that excess water would
be available for market trade.

Federal and state water subsidies,

unlimited access to ground water, ill-defined beneficial uses of
appropriated water, unlimited access to riparian waters, and
subsidized crops, all label water as an unimportant and abundant
resource, when, in fact, it is not.

Likewise, many rules governing

water allocation and consumption were based upon information that
has since proven unreasonable and is no longer appropriate for
283California Water Code § 1011 (West Supplement 1995); See also, id. at
§§ 1010, 1012 (West Supplement 1995).
284Gould, "Transfer of Water Rights," supra note 106, 469-70.
285Department of Water Resources, "Water Transfers," supra note 105, 7.
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today’s water-distribution systems.

Nevertheless, water is governed

by a highly complex and developed set of rights and rules, and a
comprehensive and complete market system cannot easily be
superimposed upon that structurelle (table 5).

It is this complexity

and ambiguity of water law which hinders the free transfer of water
rights to higher economic uses.

Therefore, in order for voluntary and

efficient redistribution to occur, water policy must be clear and
concise while physical transfer barriers must be overcome.

286McCormick, "Institutional Barriers," supra note 2, 954.

Table 5.
Chronological Development of California Water Rights
1769

First perm anent Spanish settlem ents established.
established by Spanish Law

1848

Gold discovered on the American River. Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo
signed, California ceded from Mexico, California republic established

1850

C alifornia

1851

Possessory Acts Passed California Legislature

1857

M aeris

1859

M cDonald v. Bear River Co. court ruled that appropriative water rights
w ere independent of land rights and thereby transferable

1860

L egislature authorized the form ation of levee and reclam ation districts

1860

Kidd v. Laird court ruled that senior appropriators have obligations to
ju n io r ap p ro p ria to rs

1884

Federal decision in W oodruff v. North Bloomfield, et al., requires
term ination of hydraulic mining debris discharges into C alifornia
riv e rs

1886

California Supreme Court decision in Lux v. Haggin
preem inence o f riparian rights.

1892

Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois
D o c trin e

1893

Congress forms the California Debris Commission to clear mining
debris from rivers so channels will be navigable.

1902

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation established by the federal Reclamation Act.

1913

Los Angeles Aqueduct begins transferring water from Owen’s Valley

1923

Hetch Hetchy Valley flooded and EBMUD formed

1931

County o f Origin Law passed

1933

Central

1937

Passage of the Rivers and Harbors

1940

M etropolitan W ater District opens Colorado River Aqueduct

1945

State W ater Resources Control Board created.

1951

State authorizes State W ater Project.

v.

granted

Bicknell

W ater

Rights

statehood.

case reaffirm ing

prior appropriation

reaffirms legal

modern foundation o f Public Trust

Valley Project Act passed
Act.
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Table 5 continued
1970

Passage o f the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

1972

California Legislature passes a Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.

1973

First SWP deliveries to Southern California

1976

C alifornia

1983

California Supreme Court, in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court of Alpine County, rules that the Public Trust Doctrine applies to
streams tributary to Mono Lake.

1986

Coordinated Operation agreement for CVP and SWP operations signed.

1987

Severe five year drought begins

1989

M etropolitan W ater D istrict and Imperial Irrigation D istrict agree that
MWD will pay for agricultural water conservation projects and receive
the w ater conserved.

1991

D rought W ater Bank established

experiences

severe

tw o-year

drought.
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CHAPTER 8
A N A L Y SIS
C o n c lu s io n
The growth of industrial, urban, and environmental water
demands, coupled with a long-standing tradition of poor water
management has strained California’s current water allocation
system nearly to the point of

c o lla p s e .287

The substantial advances

in scientific knowledge regarding hydrological systems have
heightened the public's awareness of many of the environmental and
socio-economic problems caused by water transfers.

It is this

additional awareness that has complicated the allocation process.
The result has been that the "old politics" of Anglo-Califomian water
policy that encouraged dam construction and water consumption
have been replaced with the "new politics" which emphasize
conservation of water and reallocation to high-value

u s e s .288

These

emerging ideologies have forced those considering water transfers to
address both public and private interests.

This research project has

focused upon the strengths and weaknesses of California’s past water
adjudication systems, the goals of an efficient and equitable

287xhe 1987-1992 drought exemplified this assertion. The city of Santa
Barbara was declared a disaster area and was eventually forced to build a
desalinization plant.
W ithout the development o f the drought water bank,
many other cities would have suffered a sim ilar fate.
288"This little water went to market," The Econom ist. 4 August 1990.
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allocation system, and two competing distributional systems:

the

Public Trust Doctrine and water marketing.289
California Indians utilized a central authority to adjudicate and
protect water resources.

This efficient water distribution system was

extremely effective because the culturally homogeneous tribal
groups were rarely, if ever, threatened by internal competing public
in te r e s ts .290

When outside interests staked claims to water

resources, violent conflicts developed and when the dispute was
finally resolved, the “winner took all.”

Thus, defending one public

interest from other public interests was paramount to a groups
cultural and physical survival.

Moreover,

the Indians expressed

concern for intergenerational resource use by protecting and
respecting their surrounding environment.

In contemporary

California society this moral obligation of the California Indians to
protect the environment is becoming more accepted.

Nevertheless,

the protection provided by the central authority to both the
environment and the group were exceptional, helping California
Indians to preserve their water resources and cultural heritage for
thousands of years.
The Spanish colonists failed in their attempts to utilize a similar
political structure to that of the Indians.

The Spanish central

authority could neither pacify the diverging public interests of
presidios, pueblos, and missions, nor control the destructive uses of
common waters by private citizens.291 The failed policies of the

289 howc , el. al, "Innovative Approaches," supra note 4.
290Hundley, The Great Thirst, supra note 35,
291 Meyer, W ater in the Hispanic Southwest, supra note 43,
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Spanish resulted from a lack of understanding of hydrological
systems, an inability to represent all public interests in their
government structure, and an inability to control the actions of
private citizens.

Despite the outcome of their policies, the Spanish

legal principles that water must satisfy both public and private uses,
and that private rights can be exercised within the realm of public
goals had a tremendous influence upon contemporary generations of
Californians.
The farmers, ranchers, and miners of California ignored the
accomplishments and failures of the Indians and the Spanish, and
developed their own form of water

a d ju d ic a tio n .292

The

decentralized political structure, which relied upon individual
initiative, was mostly successful in allocating water resources to their
highest valued

u s e s .293

Moreover, the decentralized structure briefly

solved the competing interests problem by encouraging
appropriators to divert water for the reasons they saw fit.

However,

individual short-term interests became more important than long
term public interests and the policies and law of that time were
unable to prevent many ensuing environmental and social
p r o b l e m s . 294

Nevertheless, the motivating factor of individual gain

created substantial technological and policy advances in water
292LitUefieId, “W ater Rights,” supra note 73, 417.
2 9 3 jh e uses to which I am referring are specifically private, including
farming, ranching, and mining.
The only high valued public use that had
been identified was navigation. But not until the Gold Run case were the
interconnection between public and private uses and the interconnection
betw een navigable waters and non-navigable waters identified.
2 9 4 % g environm ental problem s included m assive sedim entation from
hydraulic mining and the subsequent reduction and extinction in fish species.
Socially, the appropriators were battling the riparians and the corporate
m iners were destroying the small mining claims.
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resource adjudication which ultimately led to the construction of the
largest water distribution system in the world.
The water allocation problems of contemporary Californians are
hardly different than those of the Indians, Spanish, or Forty-Niners:
water must be allocated to societies highest-valued uses.

California’s

current adjudication problems most closely resemble those of the
Spanish experience.

Public interests are strongly divided among

preservationists, conservationists, and developers, while publicpolicy trends indicate a strong push towards a centralized
a u t h o r i t y . 295

As a result, like the Spanish experience, many

Californians have become disillusioned with the allocation system,
viewing the government as the problem rather than the solution.
The lessons provided by history are, therefore, that in order to attain
efficiency in allocation and equity in distribution, Californians must
either endorse a moral and ethical obligation to each other and the
environment, or must formulate a public policy that integrates
divergent public interests into a free market allocation system.

Both

would accomplish the same goals, but the latter would be the most
practical at this time.
S olu tion
As mentioned above, the five characteristics of the waterallocation model are:

flexibility, secure expectations, opportunity

costs, predictability, and fairness.

The Public Trust Doctrine satisfies

several criteria associated with this model.

First of all, the trust is

295xhe Audubon case exemplifies this assertion.
The government is
reasserting control o f all of the state’s navigable and non-navigable water
resources through the Public T rust Doctrine.
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relatively flexible in that it allows water to be transferred to new
uses through judicial decree.

Theoretically, the court ordered

reallocations satisfy the uses that the court believes society wants at
a given point in time.

As societies goals change, however, the court

reserves the right to reallocate water to new public uses.

Therefore,

although the involuntary reallocation system may be flexible, it
comes at the expense of stability, predictability, and secure
expectations for the codified law can be neutralized in the name of
public demand.
Water markets are also considered to be flexible allocation
systems.

As long as there is a sufficient infrastructure in place,

water can be quickly transported to various locations for various
purposes in response to changing economic needs.

However, if there

is no infrastructure in place, as is the case in many parts of rural
California, then the market would not be as flexible, and the
possibility of other detrimental side-effects could result.

In fact,

insufficient infrastructure could severely limit the supply of water
available for transfer and thereby artificially increase costs,
excluding “would-be” buyers from the market.

Limited access to the

system inevitably leads to unfair distribution.
The Public Trust Doctrine is also considered by many to be a
fair method of water allocation because it attempts to incorporate a
variety of public interests into one universal law.

They argue that

the court-ordered decrees can most effectively represent the
interests of the majority.

Yet, this apparent societal equity is often

biased against individuals or public groups that the court is also
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sworn to protect.296

por example, even though water is not a vested

property right, many other vested private rights (such as land) are
directly related to use of the water.

Thus, diminishing the water

right without compensation, diminishes the value of private land and
could be considered a taking.

If water resources are allocated by the

court in an effort to pacify volatile public opinions, then any vested
interests associated with the public water resources are no longer
secure.

If the Public Trust Doctrine allows the courts to circumvent

codified law, including California’s Constitution, what rules are the
farmers, industrialists, and environmentalists expected to obey?
Weakening secure expectations through the Public Trust
Doctrine eliminates other aspects of the water-allocation model as
well.

First, creating uncertainty by thwarting expectations

discourages personal initiative which would otherwise encourage
many water users to search for new opportunities to reduce water
consumption.

If one would not gain personal rewards (such as

money) for exploring and experimenting with other management
opportunities, then what motivation is their to pursue them?297
Second, reducing a person's desire to conserve water will reduce the
physical flexibility of the allocation system, for excess or wasted
water will not be easily identified and recovered.

Even though

involuntary transfers may readjudicate water resources, allowing
extra parties to dictate the ultimate destination of the water would
reduce response times and, therefore, be less efficient than a two296unitcd States Constitution Article IV.
The idea o f governmental
takings is perhaps the most controversial issue in the Public Trust Doctrine.
297Some argue that the fear o f losing one's water rights will encourage
water users to pursue better management techniques.
This intim idation is
called “police pow er.”
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party allocation system.

Third, since the rules of allocation are not

articulated in the Public Trust Doctrine, the predictability of the law
would be undermined.

Finally, weakening expectations is unfair to

those who have vested interests in the use of water.

Rectifying

mistakes of past legislative decisions, as was done in the A u d u b o n
case, by disregarding the written law in the name of the common
good is neither fair nor rational and it weakens expectations in
water-resource

management.

Functioning water markets keep expectations secure among
buyers and sellers as long as they follow the written rules of the law.
However, in many cases, the unpredictability of the interpretation of
the law, such as “area of origin” statutes or the “no injury rule,” break
down these expectations in a similar manner as that of the Public
Trust Doctrine, destroying the distinction between right and wrong.
Thus, the ambiguity of the written law can undermine voluntary
redistribution through the free-market system as much as the Public
Trust Doctrine.

Similarly, the expectations of individuals and

communities reliant on the products of water use could also be
destroyed.

If permanent sales of water rights become the norm,

communities once associated with those rights could be
impoverished.

However, if a small fraction of those water rights are

transferred or if transferred surface-water is replaced by ground
water then the community should remain financially solvent, and
therefore, socially intact.
Water markets could motivate individuals to identify
opportunity costs and incorporate more efficient water uses.

If, for

example, a farmer could identify a means of conserving water so that
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the salvaged water could be resold, then the discovery of new water
saving opportunities could become a significant step in reallocation
from agricultural to other high-value uses.

Moreover, creative

approaches to water use, such as "allocations with complementary
uses" or trading reclaimed water for higher quality water, could
substantially benefit many different segments of society.
Downplaying the importance of personal initiative and human
ingenuity associated with identifying opportunity costs would be
detrimental to any reallocation system.
Since the expectations of private water users and external
parties associated with the water use are in conflict, the fairness of
the water-market system must be questioned.

This distributional

consideration is extremely complex, but essentially rests upon the
definition of "beneficial and reasonable use,” the foundation of a
private water right which is intended to preserve both public and
private interests.

Water rights are not vested property rights, but

using the water is a private interest and should not necessarily be
subject to overbearing public regulation.

A functioning water market

would encourage all people to actively participate, allowing every
person the chance to purchase water for a private beneficial and
reasonable

u s e .

298

Likewise, the government, rather than taking

without compensation, could purchase water for certain public

298valerie Holcomb, ed., "Buying and Selling W ater in California:
Issues, Experience, and Policy Options," UCLA Extension Public Policy
Program, November 12-13, 1992, 14. She stated that water markets will actually
empower rural communities because they will be n the bargaining position
for thirsty (rich) cities who desperately need water. The example of the MWD
and IID interaction showed that the farm ers received not only a better
distribution system but, money from selling the excess water to the urban
d is tr ic t.
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interests to which they would be held accountable.

If a seller

refused to sell its water to the government, then the government
could exercise its power of eminent dommn.

Water markets ensure

fair distribution by securing expectations among primary, secondary,
and tertiary water users by allowing them to actively participate in
the market and the government.
The guiding principle of both the Public Trust Doctrine and
water marketing is that they seek to protect certain public or private
interests from poor water management decisions by the state
government while simultaneously reallocating water to its highest
valued uses.

Proponents of the public trust argue that the courts

make the best allocation decisions while those who favor water
marketing assert that individuals pursuing their own interests make
the best allocation decisions.

The proper solution would be for the

legislature to establish criteria that courts may apply in resolving
public trust controversies, while maintaining a free-market allocation
s y s t e m . 299

jf ^ farmer can sell a portion of water and gain that

capital, he could irrigate as much acreage as before, but more
e f f i c i e n t l y . 300

Anything that discourages market efficiency by

prohibiting transfers of surplus or conserved water to other users is
wasteful.

The major difficulty with expanding water markets and

improving their efficiency lies in the fact that the public interests are
flexible and ill-defined, which in turn leads to a lack of definition and
certainty with respect to the marketable private rights.

Successful

299Roderick E, Walston, "The Public Trust Doctrine in the W ater Rights
Context," Natural Resources Journal 29 (1989); 590.
300Valerie Holcomb, ed., "Buying and Selling W ater in California:
Issues, Experience, and Policy Options," UCLA Extension Public Policy
Program, November 12-13, 1992, 12.
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development of a water market relies upon the establishment of
clearly defined water rights, the high reliability of supply, a well
developed distribution system, a large number and diversity of
market participants, and especially to institutional rules and
administrative procedures that minimize transfer restrictions and
transaction costs.301
More generally, water transfers are simply a topic whose time
has arrived.

Current political and social moods have strengthened

this movement.

Contemporary opinions view government regulation

as anathema, and advance the marketplace as the solution to many
efficiency and distribution problems.

While the marketplace will

probably not fulfill the wishes of the entire public, market solutions
to water problems are receiving serious consideration, in turn giving
prominence to questions involving

tr a n s fe r s.302

jf water markets

can encourage better farm management, more public involvement in
government decision-making, and better public and private water
management practices, then perhaps these are grounds for
immediate water market implementation.

301 McCormick, "Institutional Barriers," supra note 2, 960.
302Gould. "Transfer of W ater Rights," supra note 106, 459.
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APPENDIX A
List of Acronyms
OCWD

Calaveras County Water District

GOA

Coordinated Operation Agreement

CVP

Central Valley Project

DWR

Department of Water Resources

EBMUD

East Bay Municipal Utilities District

EIS

Environmental Impact Statement

IID

Imperial Irrigation District

LADWP

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power

MAP

Million Acre Feet

MCWA

Monterey County Water Agency

MID

Merced Irrigation District

MWD

Metropolitan Water District

NEPA

National Environmental Policy Act

PCWA

Placer County Water Agency

PG & E

Pacific Gas and Electric

SCE

Southern California Edison Company

SMUD

Sacramento Municipal Utility District

SSWD

South Sutter Water District

SWP

State Water Project
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Table 1 continued
SWRCB

State Water Resources Control Board

TID

Turlock Irrigation District

USER

United States Bureau of Reclamation

USŒ

United States Army Corps of Engineers

YCPCWCD Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
YCWA

Yuba County Water Agency
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APPENDIX B
List of Cases
Califomia-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142, 162 (1935)
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250 (1975)

3d 199, 123 Cal.

City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105, 287 Pac. 475
(1 9 3 0 )
Clough

V.

Wing 2 Ariz. 371, 380, 17 P.453, 455 (1888)

Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857)
Eddy

Simpson 3 Cal.

V.

249 (1853)

Elmore v. imperial Irrigation District, 159 Cal.App.3d
Rptr. 433 (1984)

185, 205 Cal.

Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252
607 (1926).
Hoffman v. Stone 7 Cal.

P.

46 (1857)

Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed.
1018 (1892)
Irwin
Kidd
Lux

V.

V.

V.

Phillips 5 Cal. 140 (1855)
Laird, 15 Cal. 161, 181 (1860)

Haggin 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1866)

Maeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 261, 261 (1857)
McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River and Auburn Water and Mining
Company, 13 Cal. 220, 232-33 (1859)
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County 33 Cal.
3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P. 2d 709 (1983)
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People V . Gold Run Ditch & Mining Company 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152
(1 8 8 4 )
Sal ton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 165 Cal. App.
3d 952, 212 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1985)
Sporhase v, Nebraska 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254
(1 9 8 2 )
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APPENDIX C
Table of Statutes
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The Central Valley Project Improvement Act.
Law 102-575; 106 Stat.4706 (1992).

Title XXXIV of Public

Coordinated Operation Agreement (COA); Public Law 99-546; 100
Stat. 3050 (1986)
Possessory Acts; Stats 1851, c. 5, sec. 621 (1851); and Stats. 1852, c.
82; Calif. C.C.P. sec. 748 (1852).
Reclamation Act; 32 Stat. 388; 43 U.S.C. Section 391 (1902), ch. 1093,
32 Stat.388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-620).
The Rivers and Harbors Act; Public Law 76-868; 54 Stat. 1198 (1940)
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article V.
WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
Article X, section 2
WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA WATER CODE
Section
109
386
475
933
1010-1012
1112

1 2 1 5 -1 2 2 0
1245
1 2 5 4 -1 2 5 5
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1706

1 7 2 5 -1 7 4 6
1792
1 0 5 0 5 -1 0 5 0 5 .5
10900
11100
11128
1 1 4 6 0 -1 1 4 6 3
12200-12220

Pending Legislation
Cortez Assembly bill 97
Katz Assembly bill 52
Costa Assembly bill 1605
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